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Clifton

Piaget (1953) believed object permanence emerges through a series

Contemporary researchers have

of stages at approximately 18-months.

suggested infants achieve object permanence by 3.5-months

.

A series of

studies by Baillargeon (1987) utilized a violation-of-expectation

paradigm habituating infants to a paddle moving 180°.
trials,

a

During test

block was positioned in the path of the paddle.

During

"possible" trials, the paddle moved 120°, stopped at the block and

returned.

During the "impossible" trials, the paddle moved 180°,

seemingly through the block.

Infants looked longer at the impossible

the
events suggesting an understanding that one object cannot occupy

space of another object contiguously.

Looking times could not be

impossible event
explained by detecting perceptual novelty because the

was the more familiar of the test events.
infants look longer
Hunter and Ames (1988) have demonstrated that

thoroughly encoded habituation
at familiar stimuli if they have not
stimuli.
time,

age,

is a function of
These researchers believed that habituation

and task difficulty.

The current research examines the

impossible events because these
possibility that infants look longer at

events are perceptually familiar.

To test whether infants had

VI

.

.

sufficient opportunity to encode habituation events using the moving

paddle paradigm, the number of habituation trials and infants' age were

manipulated
Four-month-olds who received 7-180° habituation trials looked
longer at the 180° test event

(a

significant familiarity preference)

Four-month-olds receiving 7-112° habituation trials looked longer at the
112° test event

(a

significant familiarity preference)

.

Four-month-olds

receiving 12-180° habituation events looked significantly longer at the
112° test event

(a

significant novelty preference)

.

A group of 6-month-

olds habituated to 7-180° trials showed no preferential looking during
the test trials. For the four-month-olds,

looking times during the test

trials were a function of the type of familiarity event and whether
there were enough trials to fully encode the habituation events.

Looking time was not necessarily
physics.

a

function of an inferred violation of

Performance on the moving paddle paradigm might be more easily

explained by perceptual mechanisms.

VII

.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

An important issue in developmental psychology is how and when

cognitive abilities emerge.

Two contrasting theories have been

developed to address this issue.
Breinlinger, Macomber,

Spelke,

&

One view championed by Spelke (e.g.,
Jacobson,

perception and understanding of the world
to this view,

1992)

maintains that

is partly innate.

According

the brain has evolved to such a point that perceptual

constraints are already built into the brain and that an understanding
of physical phenomena is simply an emergent quality of the brain.

An alternative view is that the infant develops an understanding

environment
of physical phenomena by actively interacting with its
(Piaget,

1953;

1954; Aslin and Smith,

1988; Gopnik,

functioning develops, the infant can utilize

1996).

As neural

increasingly sophisticated

span, recall
resources such as long-term memory, greater attention

understand his/her world.
abilities, and even conscious reasoning to
philosophical tradition of
The innate view, rooted in the nat'ivist
to be developmental; perceptual
Descartes, Liebniz, and Kant, tends not
the role o£ the world is to
abilities are simply part of the brain, and

trigger this latent knowledge.

The interaction view relating to the

requires a greater
empiricism of Locke, Newton, and Helmholtz

and cognition emerge.
developmental explanation of how perception
a

Such

understanding develops, of what
view demands explanations of how

what
contiguously occurring events, of
mechanisms are used to synthesize

1

.

changes during infancy, and of how previously acquired abilities lead to

greater perceptual and cognitive abilities.
The pendulum in developmental psychology, as in philosophy, has

swung from strong empiricist accounts of development (i.e., Watson and
Skinner)

to strong claims of innate knowledge (Chomsky and Spelke)

Such oscillations are important for any discipline.

The field tends to

extract and maintain what is beneficial from every theory while

rejecting extreme ideas.

Few contemporary psychologists are as rabid

behaviorists as Watson and Skinner, yet one cannot dismiss the
importance of classical conditioning and operant conditioning for

understanding behavior.
influence

The following dissertation stresses the

of the empiricist roots of philosophy on psychology;

infants

may be active participants in their perceptual and cognitive
development, and the results of current empirical research may not

necessarily be pointing towards

a

precocious understanding of the world

2

.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE

One of the great issues in western philosophy is the debate about
the origins of knowledge.

The naive individual is struck by the

existence of a world of objects which one can see, as long as the eyes
are open and there is sufficient light.

The objects move and one moves,

yet one continues to see a stable, organized world.

Also,

one can see

forms and colors and can perceive in the absence of objects by relying
on memories.

These are simple, obvious observations.

However,

the history of

philosophy testifies to the difficulty of finding acceptable accounts of
how ordinary percepts develop.

Does all the information necessary for

accurate perception exist in the external world, or does one bring

expectations and knowledge to the perceptual encounter?

One sees the

two-dimensional
world in three-dimensions, but how does an upside-down
the upright threeimage on one's retina serve as the starting point for

dimensional perception?

Why do optical illusions persist even after

they have been recognized as such?

impressions relate to thinking?

How do various visual images ana

Are they thoughts in themselves, do

do they reflect the manipulation
they provide the vehicles of thought,
of symbolic entities,

or are they epiphenomena?

These questions are

also by psychologists who are
posed not only by philosophers, but
and cognition in early
interested in the emergence of perception

infancy

3

—

The Rationalists

The ancient Greeks modeled knowledge upon vision.

They strove to

understand how one comes to know the visible world and how this
knowledge contributes to more abstract ideas such as justice, beauty,
and ethics (Jones, 1969
(1959)

a)

.

In the Timaeus

(45 C,

Cornford)

,

Plato

declared that the eye receives coalescing rays of light from

objects, but the soul makes perception possible.

Similarly, Descartes

believed that all perception occurs in the mind and placed very little
importance on sensory organs.

In Meditations

(1641;

trans.

1963),

Descartes established his certain and irrefutable position (or so he
thought)

that he exists as a thinking being, attacked the claim that the

senses are the source of real knowledge and began to establish what
ideas are innate.

Perhaps the most famous example of Descartes

establishing innate ideas is the "wax example."
Let us begin by considering the commonest of matters, those whiuh
we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the
.Let us take, for example, this
bodies which we touch and see;
quite freshly from the hive, and
taken
been
has
it
wax:
of
piece
which it contains;
it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey
from which
flowers
the
of
odour
it still retains somewhat of the
apparent;
are
size
its
figure,
its
colour,
its
it has been culled;
it with the
strike
you
if
and
handled,
easily
cold
it is hard,
Finally all the things which are
finger it will emit a sound.
body, are met
requisite to cause us to distinctly to recognize a
the fire
approach
and
speak
I
while
within it. But notice that
the
evaporates,
smell
the
exhaled,
is
taste
what remains of the
it
increases,
size
colour alters, the figure is destroyed, the
when
and
it,
handle
one
Scarcely can
becomes liquid, it heats.
Does the same wax remain
one strikes it, no sound is emitted.
it remains; none would
that
confess
must
after this change? We
know so distinctly in this piece
ludge otherwise? What then did I
nothing of all that the senses
of wax? ^ It could certainly be
things which fall under
brought to my notice since all of these
are found to be changed,
hearing
and
taste smell sight, touch,
must then grant that I could not
and yet the same wax remains... We
imagination what this piece^o wa
even understand through the
perceives it (PP- 50-bl).
and that it is my mind alone which
.

4

.

In this clever example,

Descartes demonstrated what the five

senses reveal about the nature of the wax; when he subjects the wax to
the fire, he shows that every characteristic of the wax changes.

He

then reminded the reader that he knows it is the same wax, but how can
we know this if the senses tell us the opposite?

concept of "sameness?"

Where do we get the

According to Descartes, it cannot be from the

senses because their data are constantly in flux.
that the concept of "sameness"

Descartes believed

(more formally the concept of identity)

must be an innate idea because it cannot be derived from observation.
We are born with the knowledge of the principle of identity, A

This knowledge is absolutely necessary; is an

presupposed by any other knowledge.

a

= A.

priori truth; and is

If we did not know this truth,

we

could not know any truth.
The wax example also generates the innate idea of material

substance.

According to Descartes, this idea cannot be derived from the

senses alone.

Imagine NASA’s Mars probe which has sensors to detect

tactile, visual, and auditory data from the surface of Mars.

The

of minerals
machine is able to perform analyses to determine the types

can send these data back
and the temperature of the planet, etc., and it
to Earth.

attributes (e.g.,
The machine would be able to determine

it would not be able to
carbon-based, capable of locomotion, soft), but

the concepts of identity
determine if life has been discovered without
(this is the same as what?)

and substance (what is this thingness?),

it did have these concepts,

the
then it would be able to organize

sensorial data into

a

coherent picture of the world.

5

B.

The Empiricists

There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy that perception,

especially touch and vision, provides undeniably true knowledge.
Philosophers have generally sought certainty and have often claimed
In contrast,

it.

scientists, who are accustomed to their theories being

modified and upset by new data, generally settle for an interpretation
that encompasses the greatest amount of data in the simplest and most

elegant manner.

Philosophers depend on the certainty of knowledge from

the senses because of the need to secure premises for their arguments
for experience.

Scientists, on the other hand, are used to errors in

measurement and observation by instruments, and have consequently found
it necessary to repeat experiments;

reliability from the senses.

they do not readily expect

Indeed, many scientific instruments have

been developed precisely because of the limitations of the senses and
Furthermore,

the unreliability of perception.

it is easy to produce and

demonstrate many kinds of dramatic illusions which could hardly occur

perception constituted direct reliable knowledge.
there
However, with the emergence of empiricism in philosophy,
from
became a greater interest in the separation of sense data
the mind to form
perception and in how sense data become combined by

percepts.

to present
Such a philosophical view might be compared

and cognition.
theories of bottom-up processing for perception

1

.

The Empiri cism of Locke

empiricism appeared in the Essa
The first modern statement of
and
^n^ninn Human nndsust.andung (1690, 1990) by English Physician
'

6

if

philosopher John Locke who wanted to apply the law of parsimony and to
rid philosophy of positing innate ideas in building theories of
epistemology.

Locke's main epistemological thesis is put forth in the

following passage:
Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, a blank slate tabula
rasa) of white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas;
how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store,
which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with
almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason
and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience:
In
that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately
derives itself (Bk. 2, Chap. 1, Sec. 2).
(

In order for Locke to establish the theory that the mind is a

blank slate, he would have to refute the rationalists' arguments that
knowledge is based on innate ideas.

To this end he states:

The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it
It is an established opinion among some men that
not innate.
there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some
.characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind
primary notions,
receives in its very first being and brings
soul
which
the
man
of
It would be sufficient to convince
into the world with it.
unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I
should only show. .how men, barely by the use of their natural
faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the
help of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty,
without any such original notions or principles (Bk. 1, chap. 2,
sec
1
.

.

.

.

)

.

In the rest of the Essay Concerning H u man Understanding

,

Locke

his theory
elaborates on the simple idea of the blank slate and develops
of knowledge.

Locke begins by making several distinctions: the

between particular
distinction between simple and complex ideas, another
and secondary qualities.
and general ideas, and a third between primary

a.

Simple and Complex Ideas

that cannot be further
Locke believed simple ideas are those
as the ideas of "solidity" or
analyzed into simpler components such

7

.

purple

All such ideas are derived from experience in the world via

the senses.

Complex ideas are

(1)

gratitude, the universe),

compounds of simple ideas (e.g., beauty,

(2)

ideas of relations (e.g.,

larger than,

smaller than) created by setting two ideas next to each other and

comparing or contrasting them, or

(3)

abstractions, where the mind

separates out a feature of an idea and generalizes

(e.g.,

it

bluntness).

Abstractions are formed when we recognize a certain characteristic that
That characteristic is assigned a

group of objects has in common.

a

name, which is a symbol for that characteristic.

b.

Primary and Secondary Qualities

According to Locke, primary qualities were characteristics that

necessarily inhered in mutual bodies.

They comprised:

figure, motion or rest, and number."

extension,

solidity,

Secondary qualities

in the
were defined as "such qualities, which in truth are nothing

objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations

m

us by

figure, texture, and
their primary qualities, that is, by the. bulk,

sounds, tastes, etc.
motion of their insensible parts, as colors,
2,

chap.

8,

sec.

(Bk.

10)

correct ideas according to
Our ideas of primary qualities are
Locke.

our minds by those qualities
That is, these ideas are caused in

those qualities
and these ideas correctly represent

.

On the other hand

the
qualities do not oorrectly represent
the ideas we have of secondary
primary qualities of bodies are
Locke stated -...the ideas of
world.

bodres
patterns do really exist in the
resemblances of them, and their

8

.

.

themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary Qualities

have no resemblance of them at all.

existing in the bodies themselves."

There is nothing like our ideas o:
(Bk.

2,

chap.

8,

sec.

15)

This epistemological view is known as representative realism.

It

holds that there is a real world "out there," and it is representative

because the mind does not have to give direct access to reality.
Rather, the mind represents reality in much the same way a photograph
does.

Just as some characteristics of

a

photo correctly represent the

world (e.g., number, shape, relative size, etc.), some features of the
mind correctly represent the world (our ideas of primary qualities)
Furthermore,

just as some characteristics of a photo are purely features

of the photo

(e.g.,

its black and white presentation,

its two-

dimensionality, its glossiness, etc.), the features of the mind pertain
only to the mind and not to the world (our ideas of secondary

qualities

c.

)

Substances

In western philosophy,

"substance" has traditionally been the term

basic independent reality.
naming whatever is thought to be the most
exist independently of otter
Aristotle defined substance as whatever can

(Aristotle’s examples) can exist
things, so that a horse or a man
horse or the size of the man cannot.
independently, but the color of the

rationalists took the idea of substance as
The 17th and 18th century
one of their members, Spinoza,
independent being so seriously that
one
substance in the world (i.e., only
claimed there could be only one

9

.

thing)

,

.

namely, God, because only God could exist independently

(Copleston,

1960; Jones,

1969b)

With the distinction between simple/complex ideas and

primary /secondary qualities, Locke believed he provided

parsimonious theory of knowledge.

However,

a simple,

Locke had difficulty in

explaining the key philosophical category of substance.
Our Obscure Idea of Substance in General.
So that if anyone will
examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in
general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only
a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which
are capable of producing simple ideas in us... If anyone should be
asked, 'What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres?'
he
would have nothing to say but, 'The solid extended parts.’ And if
he were demanded, "What is it that solidity and extension inhere
he would have nothing to say but, 'The solid extended
in?"
And if he were demanded, 'What is it that solidity and
parts.'
extension inhere in?' he would not be in much better case than
the Indian. .who, saying that the world was supported by a great
to which his
elephant, was asked 'what the elephant rested on?'
answer was, 'A great tortoise'; but being again pressed to know
what gave support to the broadbacked tortoise, replied - something
(Bk. 2, chap. 23, sec. 2)
he knew not what
.

The fact that Locke was unable to describe substance ("something

know not what") seems to pose

a

I

large problem to his epistemology,

although he did not seem to realize this in the Essay (Jones, 1969b)

.

Once one introduces the metaphysics of substance (i.e., once one accepts
or
that given anything in the world, it is either a substance

characteristic of substance)

,

coherent account of substance.

a

then one has to be prepared to render

a

Locke fails on this account, and this

Descartes to posit substance
very issue of substance opened the door for
as being an innate idea.

10

.

2^.

Berkeley

.

'

s

Extension of Locke

Berkeley thought that Locke's errors about the origins of

knowledge could be remedied by attacking the notion of material
substance that put Locke into
Locke had written:

a

philosophical quagmire.

"Since the mind,

In his Essay

in all its thoughts and reasonings,

hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which

it alone does or

can contemplate,

it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant

about them"

4,

(Bk.

chap.

1,

sec.

1).

Berkeley realized that if this

statement were literally true, then it is impossible to know something
that is not an idea.

But Locke had claimed that we know that many of

these ideas are caused by real things in the physical world (material
substances) and particularly by their primary qualities, which have the

power to produce the ideas of both primary and secondary qualities in
our minds

Berkeley initially demonstrated Locke's apparent self-

contradiction by undoing the primary- secondary quality distinction.
Berkeley argued that primary and secondary qualities are really the same
£hing.

How does one establish the size and shape of

looking at it or feeling it?

a

table except by

The first act produces the secondary

qualities
qualities of color, and the second act produces the secondary
of tactile sensation.

One knows the size and shape of the brown cable

the white of the wall, and
by contrasting the brown of the table against

along its surface and noting
the tan of the rug by running one's hand

resistance end.
where the sensations of smoothness and

Our ideas of

than interpretations or
primary qualities are really nothing more

secondary qualities.

(except
According to Berkeley, all of our ideas

11

.

.

for God and self)

t.

are nothing but ideas of secondary qualities or

interpretations of them.

In a Treatise Concerning the Principle-,

r,

Human Knowledge (1710. 1990), Berkeley wrote:
It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human
knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the
senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions
and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of
memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
By
sight I have the ideas of light and colour with their several
degrees and variations.
By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat
and cold, motion and resistance... smelling furnishes me with
odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the
mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several
of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be
marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for
example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence
having been observed to go together are accounted one distinct
thing, signified by the name "apple"; other collections of ideas
constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things;
which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions
(part 1, Sec. 1)
of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth

This passage captures almost all of Berkeley's epistemology.

Like

Descartes, Berkeley attempts to start with what is certain (i.e., what
is given)

.

For Berkeley, what is certain are ideas of secondary

qualities which he calls ideas or sensations (known as sense-data)
Infants come into the world with certain given sense-data:
sounds,

tastes, odors, and tactile sensations.

colors,

These data do not

constitute a world for the infant; rather, they comprise

a

chaos of

world
fluctuating sensations (similar to James' notion of the infant's
as a "blooming,

buzzing,

confusion")

During the course of infancy, the

of the world by
infant learns to read these data and make sense

events and by learning
recognizing patterns of contiguously-occurring

language

12

.

Sources of Sense Data

a.

Both Descartes and Locke believed that sense-data are caused by

substances "out there," which in turn are caused by God (they both tried
to argue that substances are caused by an infinite series of causes

-

the table comes from atoms, the atoms come from the explosion of the big
bang, but what comes before the Big Bang?)

(Copleston,

1960).

Berkeley

eliminated material substance from this chain of events and claimed that
sense-data come directly from God who was the gaurantor of the

orderliness of the universe (i.e., of the orderliness of sense-data).

3

.

The Radical Skepticism of Hume

Hume was committed to the central ideas of empiricism that the

mind is a tabula rasa, that there were no innate ideas, and that all
knowledge is derived from sense data.

However, he believed that Locke

and Berkeley were not consistent in applying these ideas (Jones, 1969b)
Hume believed that there are two kinds of sentences; sentences which

express relations of ideas (analytic propositions) or they express

matters of fact (synthetic propositions)
the following characteristics:

contradiction;
and

(4)

(2)

(1)

.

Analytic propositions have

Their negation leads to a self-

They are a priori;

(3)

They are true by definition;

Copleston, 1960)
They are necessarily true (Jones, 1969b;

following sentence:
To illustrate this point, consider the

triangles have three angles."

.

"All

have
To claim that "not all triangles

is both false and selfthree angles," one says something that

not have three angles is not
contradictory because any figure that does

13

3 triangle

The sentence is a priori.

.

One does not discover its truth

by looking anywhere or counting angles.
by contemplating its meaning.
is,

it

given the definition of

The truth is simply understood

The sentence is true by definition.

a

That

triangle as "a three-sided closed figure,"

follows that a triangle must have three, and only three, angles.

sentence is necessarily true.

The

It cannot be false given the current

conventions of the English language.
It may seem that Hume is a rationalist in the same vein as

Descartes.

However, Hume adds the final characteristic of analytic

propositions that they are all tautologies.
and repetitious.

For example,

the predicate

That is, they are redundant
("has three angles") merely

repeats what was already in the subject ("a triangle").
For Hume, even though there is a priori knowledge,

about anything but itself.
reality,

is never

it

A priori truths can never tell us about

so the rationalistic position of a deductive system of

knowledge made up of purely

a

Analytic

priori truths is not possible.

truths are nothing more than definitions, parts of definitions, and only

show how ideas can be related to each other:

"A = A,"

"2

+

2

=

4,"

"sisters are girls."

Synthetic propositions are the opposite of analytic propositions.
"secondary
They are necessarily derived from sense-data (Locke's

qualities" and "Berkeley's ideas").

To discern whether a sentence like

must determine whether the
"Cindy has a white dog" is meaningful, one

perceptions.
main idea can be traced back to simple

step which is easily done,

proposition.

Of course,

this

synthetic
is considered by Hume to be a

propositions are the only
For Hume, analytic and synthetic

empiricist program.
possible kinds of meaning in a truly

14

Any sentence

.

that is neither analytic

(not a tautology)

cannot be traced to sense perceptions)
Copleston,

1960

nor synthetic

is nonsense

(its ideas

(Jones,

1969b;

)

Hume's view is a form of radical skepticism because he does not

have a need for God in his epistemology.

attacked when the sentence,
exist")

Berkeley's notion of God is

"God exists," is negated ("God does not

and does not produce a self-contradiction.

Because there is no

self-contradiction, this sentence is not an analytic proposition.
Furthermore, the idea of God cannot be traced back to sense-data
(Berkeley's position), therefore this is not a synthetic proposition
either.

For Hume, the idea of God is literally nonsense.

This view of empiricism runs into a problem when one asks,
the orderliness of the world explained without

a

"how is

notion of God?"

Hume

had to admit that on purely empirical grounds it is difficult to answer
that question.

Hume assumed that it is not God but universal causality

that holds things together, and there is no sense-datum to which we can

trace the idea of

a cause.

That is, no perceptual difference exists

between causality and seriality.
X happens,

The sentence,

"X causes Y,

and

First

then Y happens," are confirmed by exactly the same sense-

data, yet they seem to have very different meanings.

If there is no

connections
such thing as "causality," then there are no necessary

between any two things in the universe.

This is precisely what Hume

Copleston, 1960).
deduced from his radical empiricism (Jones, 1969b;

certain idea of the
Descartes maintained that he had an absolutely
self.

Berkeley, but Hume was
This view was ignored by both Locke and

knowledge, God, and
skeptical of that idea as he was of innate

causality.

In the

of Human N ature

15

(1735,

1990)

he wrote:

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call our self; that is we feel its
existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain,
beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect
identity and simplicity ... For my part, when I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble in some
particular perception of other, of heat or cold, light or shade,
love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
I never can catch myself at any
time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the
perception ... But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I
may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed
each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perceptual
flux and movement.
Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without
varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than
our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to
this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which
remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment (Bk. 1, chap.
4

sec

,

.

6

)

.

Hume's radical empiricism could not find justification for the
ideas of God, causality, or the self.

His skepticism ran so deep that

certainly innate knowledge and perhaps any knowledge seemed untenable.

4

.

Kant

1

s

Reply to Hume

In the Or

i

t

i

one of Pure Reason (1781), Kant replied to Hume's

skepticism and also offered
and the rationalists.

a

certain compromise between the empiricists

Kant rejected the idea of the tabula rasa .because

the mind was not a passive receptacle of neutral sense-data.

Kant also

innate
rejected the rationalist's concept that infants are born with

ideas (Copleston,

a.

1960; Jones,

1969b)

Kant's Theory of Knowledge

To save epistemology

(perhaps all of philosophy)

empiricism of Hume, Kant had to invent

a

from the radio

new conception of knowledge.

does indeed have as its source the
Kant agreed with Hume that knowledge

16

Humean notion of impressions whereby the mind passively receives sensedata and copies it as images in thought.

However, Kant continued, and

described another element in our knowledge not derived from sensory
experience nor from an independent reality.

This element comes from the

mind itself.
According to Kant, the mind at birth is not
empiricists stressed.

It

a

blank tablet as the

is endowed with its own pure concepts which

serve to organize the incoming flux of sensory impressions into
substances, qualities, and quantities, and into causes and effects.
Kant,

For

the mind is furnished with twelve pure concepts or categories

(Table 2.1).

Table 2.1.

Kant

'

s

Pure Concepts of Understanding

QUANTITY

QUALITY

RELATION

MODALITY

unity

affirmation

substance-accidents

possibility

plurality

negation

cause-effect

actuality

totality

limitation

causal reciprocity

necessity

Secondly, the mind is not passive as the empiricists claimed.

mind does not merely receive sense-data, as
stream of sense impressions.

a

television screen does,

The
a

The mind actively interprets the world

what comes to or
rather than passively receiving and recording in memory

from the external world through the senses.

The categories of the mind

as substances, with
organize the sensory flux and give it meaning

causes and effects, or in
qualities, and quantities, or related as
1960).
reciprocal causation (Jones, 1969c; Copleston,

17
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These concepts of the understanding are considered by Kant to be
3 priori

He means by this that they are

.

(1)

logically prior to

experience; they are presupposed by all experience and

(2)

that they are

independent of experience; experience can never change them.

They give

us the experience and knowledge that we have because they are the only

ways we can understand

mind are

(3)

anything.

Furthermore, the pure concepts of the

universal; they form the structure of any mind or any

consciousness.

A further aspect of these concepts is

(4)

they are

necessary (i.e., a necessary condition of experience); without them
there is no knowledge, one cannot even have any experience (Jones,
1969c; Copleston,

1960).

For Kant, these concepts furnish the necessary element for

knowledge that Hume neglected to take into consideration.

It is the

mind which supplies the necessary concepts which organize and unify the
flux of sensation.

Without the

a

The world we know is a world created by the mind.

priori concept of substance to organize the flux of sense

impressions, one could not experience anything.

Without the a prior i,

concept of cause, which organizes sense impressions into causes and
effects, one could never experience causality.

Rather, one would only

experience a particular sequence of atomistic sense impressions.
because it
Hume's theory of knowledge is wrong, according to Kant,
things causally, and
does not account for the fact that we do experience
Kant believed

events.
we do have scientific knowledge of things and

that all knowledge consists
that Hume's theory fails because Hume holds

merely of sense impressions.

Hume's theory lacked mechanisms which

(i.e., the
structure the empirical data of the senses

concepts)

.

18
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prior i

It

should also be pointed out that Kant's pure concepts of the

understanding are not the same as, and should not be confused with
Descartes

'

innate ideas

.

Descartes held that the innate ideas

correspond to an independent reality and that the mind is endowed with
these ideas by God so that we can know the true nature of reality.

does not make this claim.

Kant

The pure concepts of the understanding are

only forms of our consciousness and do not correspond to any sort of
independent reality.

understand things.

They are merely the underpinning of the way we

They do not tell us anything about what things are

like in themselves independently of our understanding them by our

concepts.

The concepts are not structures of reality,

instead they are

the structures of our minds (i.e., what our minds can know).

They are

significant only epistemologically and more specifically they are
significant only as foundations of knowledge.

19
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CHAPTER III

SCIENTIFIC THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

A.

The Helmholtz View of Perception

Following the philosophical foundation of perception and knowledge
by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, one of the first great

scientific theories of vision was proposed by Helmholtz in his Handbook
of Physiological Ootics published in 1866.
3,

Helmholtz argued in Volume

section 26 of his Ootics that it is not parsimonious to posit innate

mechanisms of perception when:
is not clear how the assumption of these original 'space
sensations' can help the explanation of our visual perceptions,
when the adherents of this theory ultimately have to assume in by
far the great majority of cases that these sensations must be
overruled by the better understanding which we get by experience.
In that case, it would seem to me much easier and simpler to
grasp, that all apperception's of space were obtained simply by
experience (p.18).
It

Helmholtz held that perceptions are both hypotheses and

conclusions of unconscious inductive inferences.

Introducing this idea,

language.
he compared visual perception with language and how we learn

Helmholtz declared that as with meanings of words,

"the concept of the

about with
normal meaning of frequently repeated perceptions can come

slightest
immutable certainty, lightening speed and without the

meditation"

(p.

28)

of word with meaning
Helmholtz stressed that forming associations

perception results from regular
and of sensation with meaning in
few exceptions.
experiences of the connection with no or
to
accrue inductively from many instances

20
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Meanings

conclusion that is not

:

logically necessary.

For both language and perceptions, these

associations are formed by interaction with objects.
patterns of the grain of wood become associated with

For example,
a

the

hard substance

which can be dropped without breaking, and the transparency of glass
becomes associated with potentially dangerous brittleness.
of these synthesized perceptions,

As a result

one behaves differently with wooden as

opposed to glass objects.
Helmholtz suggested that we form our ideas of the physical form of
objects inductively, by combining visual experiences from many different
viewpoints,

following the rules of perspective.

Comparing these

inductive conclusions with the scientific method, Helmholtz stated,
"Inductive conclusions are never so reliable as well-tested conclusions
of conscious thought ... False inductions in the interpretation of our

perceptions we tend to label as illusions

...

these unconscious

conclusions derived from sensations are equivalent

... to

conclusions from

He emphasized the active structuring of perception which is

analogy."

especially evident in conditions of dim illumination, or when complex
crystals or other structures are viewed stereoscopically
,

visual impression may be misunderstood at first, by not knowing
how to attribute the correct depth-dimensions; as when a distant
light, for example, is taken to be near one, or vice-versa.
the
Suddenly, it dawns on us what it is, and immediately, under
perceptual
correct
the
comprehension,
correct
the
of
influence
image also is developed in its full intensity. .Similar
elements
experiences have happened to everybody, proving that the
just as
are
experience
from
derived
are
that
in sense perceptions
sensations
(p.
powerful as those that are derived from present
a

.
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.

acceptance of stimulus
Perception does not arise from the passive
knowledge of objects and
patterns, but rather from internally organized

processes.

In other words,

stored representations are utilized

reading sensory signals, as
top-down fashion for interpreting or

21
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a

originating from particular objects.
of words on what we describe.

Similarly, we project our meanings

The idea that processes search for the

best interpretation of available evidence is similar to present theories
of perception which involve active computational processes by the brain.

B.

Marr's Theory of Percent ion

Exciting developments have occurred during the 20th century.

Neuroscientists have developed

a

sophisticated understanding of the

neural systems which underlie perception.

Engineers and computer

scientists have developed the computer models of artificial
intelligence.

Psychology has a new subfield called cognitive science.

With these developments, new and exciting theories of perception began
to emerge which posited few neurologically plausible constraints and

allowed for the development of data-driven theories of perception.

A

particularly remarkable theory of vision is Marr's description of the
relationship between anatomical/physiological observations and

perceptual functioning (Marr, 1982; Bruce and Green, 1987).

Marr's

approach to understanding visual perception is described in the
following passage:
as a
Almost never can a complex system of any kind be understood
simple extrapolation from the properties of its elementary
Consider for example, some gas in a bottle. A
components.
pressure,
description of thermodynamic effects - temperature, is not
factors
these
among
relationships
density, and the
each of the
for
one
equations,
of
set
large
a
using
formulated by
own
their
at
described
particles involved. Such effects are
is
or
e
the
particles;
of
level that of the enormous collection
macroscopic
the
and
microscopic
the
to show that in principle
19, 198
descriptions are consistent with one another (p.

differed from the
Marr's data-driven theory of perception

perception
Gibsonian view (see next chapter) in that
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direct and all

information necessary for perception is contained in the environment
itself.

Marr believed that a theory of visual perception should account

for neural processing and to predict outcomes of empirical studies.

Marr proposed three levels of explanation:
algorithm, and implementation.

primal sketch defined as
in a stimulus.

Next,

a

a 2

First,

computational theory,

there is a formation of the raw

representation of the light intensity changes
1/2-D sketch is formed which is a

representation of the depths and orientations of the visible surfaces of
an object.

top-down processing is used to form a 3-D

Finally,

representation of the object.
Visual processes are designed to sort out factors of geometry,

reflectance of a surface,
viewpoint.

illumination of a scene, and determination of

The multi-phased procedure of forming the primal sketch

involves steps such as detecting intensity changes, representing and

analyzing local geometrical structure, and detecting illuminating
effects (i.e., light sources, highlights, and transparencies).

The

steps reveal changes in illumination that occur in a scene at the point

where the edges and changes in surface contour are likely to occur.
This phase ends with a representation that makes explicit the size and

disposition of intensity changes, enabling one to detect the boundaries
in an image and their source.

The raw primal sketch consists of a set

of blobs oriented in various directions.

Hubei and Wiesel

1

s

This is similar to the role of

feature detectors which can discern contrasts and

general orientation.

These reductions and simplifications are mental

information"
representations or symbolic depictions of the "raw

transmitted by the light.

According to Marr, perception consists of
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.

series of such simplified sketches en route to a more veridical view of
the world.

Following the formation of the primal sketch, other processes

operate upon it to derive

visible surfaces.
of shading,

a

representation of the geometry of the

These processes include stereopsis, the use of cues

texture, occluding contours, and various aspects of motion.

In global stereopsis,

the perceive develops an internal representation

that includes information on depth, surface orientation, and surface

discontinuities.

Like the primal sketch, the

2

1/2-D sketch is

constructed in a viewer-centered coordinate frame.

It depends on a

single vantage point and therefore cannot explain one of the most

important facts about visual perception

-

the perceived constancy of the

shape of an object despite movements by the viewer.

Marr claimed that the goal of early visual processing is to

construct a

2

1/2-D sketch.

This process avoids the problems of

traditional psychological analysis associated with intuitive

distinctions like figure, ground, region, and object.

modules of early visual processing and the

The various

1/2-D sketch itself explain

2

only the discovery of the surface properties of an image.

These steps

trees, or
occur in the same way, whether one is viewing people, animals,

paintings.

the
Only shapes and reflections need to be made clear to

viewer at this point.

As Marr claimed,

the

2

1/2-D sketch is the final

a particular object or
step before a surface is interpreted (as being

sets of objects);

in fact,

it may well

mark the end of purely perceptual

processes
involves the
The final step of early visual processing

representation that is matched to
transformation of shapes from a pure

24

the processes of perception into a representation that is suitable for

recognition.

The next task is object recognition which requires a

stable shape description that does not depend on a particular momentary
viewpoint.

Thus,

the pieces of a shape must be described in terms of a

frame of reference based on the shape itself.

A scheme for representing

shapes involves the use of a coordinate system and component axes

identified from an image that captures what is specific about the
objects in question.
What does this mean in practice? The object is broken down into

components and subcomponents until all of its parts have been uniquely
The model's coordinate system and component axes are

specified.

identified from an image, and the arrangement of the component axes in
that coordinate system is specified.

The products of a primal sketch

resemble line segments oriented in various directions.

For example,

the

products of the 3-D sketch resemble stick figures composed of pipe
cleaners.

The brain automatically transposes the contours it has

derived from the
stick figures.

2

1/2-D sketch onto axes of symmetry that resemble

By the time the 3-D sketch has been constructed, the

final result should be a unique description of any object one can

distinguish.

The same object should always yield the same unique

description regardless of the angle of viewing, and different
objects,
representations should reflect the similarity between different

while also preserving whatever differences may matter.
presumably both humans
There are a series of steps through which
a scene or an image.
and machines must pass in making sense of

The

the primal sketch consists of
first is computational; the formation of

collection of features like
description o£ a scene in terms of a vast
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edges,

,

blobs which are the kinds of feature that may depend upon

lines,

neural detectors described by Hubei and Wiesel.

This primary sketch, an

initial symbolic representation of the image, is formed by processing

mechanisms that are completely independent of any high level knowledge
about objects.

The second stage involves analysis of the primal sketch

by symbolic processes that are capable of grouping lines, points, and

blobs together in various ways.

blob before knowing that it is

That is, one can see a round triangular
a

chestnut tree.

Correlatively

individuals with certain varieties of brain damage may be able to see
shapes quite reliably without knowing what the objects represent
(Weizkrantz,

In the final stages,

1986).

an actual identification of an

object along with its component parts is made, and this identification

should uniquely determine which object is perceived.

Top-down knowledge

about the nature and construction of the objects of the world presumably
is applied in this last phase of early visual processing.

this scheme,

According to

the sorts of knowledge about the world which earlier had

been believed essential for perception actually arise only after shapes
have been completely analyzed.
Marr

1

s

theory of vision is

a

data-driven theory of perception.

and
This theory takes into account various levels of processing,

it

visual
requires few constraints and no innate knowledge to produce

perception.

Marr

'

s

system requires little top-down knowledge for

perception
and in Vision (1982), he
Marr was not a developmental psychologist
the infant is endowed with at
did not describe what cognitive abilities
the neonate ever develops
birth to develop the 3-D sketch nor how

sketch without innate knowledge.
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Marr

'

s

theory is important for

a 3-D

developmental psychologists because

it

provides a framework for dividing

and studying the development of what is anatomical/physiological and
what is cognitive and the interactions between these two domains.
A complete model of infant perception must account for

whether

the infant is endowed with knowledge at birth, or if there is no innate

knowledge, how such knowledge emerges.

In the following section,

developmental psychology's attempts to understand the emergence of

perception and knowledge during infancy will be discussed.
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CHAPTER IV

PIAGET'S THEORY OF OBJECT PERMANENCE

Since Piaget first published his books on the nature of cognitive

development in infants and children, it has been widely believed that
the development of object permanence is one of the central milestones of

early cognitive development and serves to underlie the development of
later cognition (e.g., Gruber and Voneche, 1975).

For Piaget,

the

object concept has three implicit, common-sense beliefs that people
share about the basic nature of objects and themselves (Piaget,

chap

pp.

1,

3-4).

First,

1954,

the adult believes that all objects coexist as

physically distinct and independent entities within

a

common space.

the existence of other objects, whether animate or inanimate is

Second,

independent of one's interaction or non-interaction with these other
objects.

For example, when an object disappears from view, there is no

When one

automatic assumption that the object has lost its existence.

stops seeing, hearing, or touching an object, this action is not

confused with the physical existence of the object and thus,

it is not

believed that it has been annihilated once one loses sensory contact
with it.

For those with the Piagetian notion of object permanence,

"out

existence."
of sight" might mean "out of mind" but not "out of
Finally,

one's
just as an object's existence is independent of

physical contact,

with it.

it

contact
is also independent of one's psychological

object could move or
One knows that once gone from sight, an

be moved from one location to another.

It may or may not continue to

seen; one may or may not have to
exist in the place where it was last
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.

look for it in a new location.

In summary,

according to Piaget, the

object concept is a notion which holds that other objects and oneself
are equally real and objective, and the existence and behavior of other

objects are fundamentally independent of one's perceptual and motor
contact with them.
Piaget made several important claims about the development of the

object concept (1954, chap 1).

First,

Piaget claimed that this

conception of objects is not innate, but rather, acquired through
experience

(p.

4).

Second,

the acquisition is a gradual process that

develops over the entire span of infancy, i.e., the entire sensorimotor

period from birth through 18-months (chap
a universal,

1)

.

This process consists of

fixed sequence of six developmental substages with the

infant acquiring different aspects of the full concept at each stage
(

chap

1

)

In the first stage,

from birth to one-month,

objects within their visual field (pp. 4-13).

infants look at

However, they do not

follow with their eyes an object that moves away.

The infants show no

behavior that could be interpreted as a visual or manual search for the

vanished object.

There is no evidence to suggest that the infant has

any mental representation of the object's oncoming existence, once

visual contact with it is lost
prolong
During the second stage, between 1- and 4-months, infants
it disappeared; and
their looks at the place where an object was before

went.
they do not actively attempt to find where it

For example,

if

may continue looking at
they are playing with a toy and drop it, they
on the floor (pp. 4-13).
their hand rather than looking for the toy
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During Stage

3

.

(48 months), the infant shows some progress

in

differentiating objects as independent entities from the self's
action
towards objects (pp. 13-44).

The infant begins to anticipate the future

positions by extrapolating from the present direction of movement.
an object falls from the crib to the floor,

If

the infant may lean over to

look for it rather than simply stare motionlessly at the spot where it

was before it disappeared.
In Stage

4

(8-12 months)

of the development of object permanence,

infants begin to manually search for and retrieve an object that they
see someone hide under a cloth or other cover (pp. 44-66).

However,

they make a peculiar mistake under some circumstances during this stage

known as the A-not-B error.

If they see an object hidden twice in

succession under the same container, they retrieve the object from there
each time.

If they then see the same object hidden under a different

container, however, they look under the original container where they

found it before.

It is as if the original container has assumed an

independent status as
In Stage

5

a

hiding place.

(12-18 months),

infants stop making the A-not-B error

and search wherever they last saw the object hidden

(pp.

66-86)

However, they have difficulty with invisible displacements.

If an

object is placed under one pillow and then is moved in sight of the
object
infant and placed under another, the infant will look for the

the new hiding place.

However,

infants will not look in the new

location unless they saw the object moved.

By 18-24 months

(Stage 6),

and they
infants understand this type of complex displacement
not they saw the
immediately search in the correct place whether or

movement of the object

(PP-

m

86-96)
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Since Piaget published his original account of object concept

development, much follow-up research has been done (see Gratch,
Harris,

1983; Wellman, Cross, & Bartsch,

1987 for reviews)

.

1975;

Much of the

early research confirmed that young infants fail to search for hidden
objects,

thus supporting Piagetian theory.

Several groups of

investigators examining large samples and utilizing longitudinal and

cross-sectional research paradigms have found the same behavioral
patterns that Piaget described, and furthermore, observed them occurring
in the same age sequence

(e.g.,

Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975).

Until the past

decade or so, most theorists accepted Piaget's assertion that the infant
was not born with the object concept and must acquire it during the

course of infancy.
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CHAPTER V

GIBSON'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The work of J.J. Gibson and especially the work of E.J. Gibson has

had an important influence on the theorizing of infant perceptual

development (J.J. Gibson, 1950, 1966; E.J. Gibson, 1988; Gibson
Spelke,

1983; Gibson,

1995).

Like Piaget,

&

the Gibsons elaborated a

theoretical formulation in their writings and raised important

epistemological points.

In the later part of her career,

E.J. Gibson

has focused her research on the development of infant perception

according to the theoretical tenants of their larger theory of
perception.

Traditional views of perception have focused on finding

correlation between
perceives.

a

particular stimulus and what

a

a

person consciously

Perceiving different colors is simply a function of the
Perceiving

experimenter's manipulating different wavelengths of light.

changes in musical tones is simply the Result of detecting changes in
the frequency of air vibrations.

This traditional psychophysical view

describes the relationship between changes in stimuli and perception.
approach.
Gibson's ecological theory of perception had a different

wavelength of light
J.J. Gibson focused his efforts not on a given
light in the ambient array.
but instead concentrated on the variation of

organized in such
Gibson believed that the environment was

a

way that

information and perceive certain
the perceiver was able to take in this

spatial properties.

For example,

texture gradients are an intrinsic,

the perceptual system is able
natural part of the landscape, and because
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to take in information about texture gradients,

perceive depth.

the observer can

Another example is visual proprioception, whereby the

movement of the observer's body and the movement of other objects allows
for a change in the ambient array and provides for perceptual

information beyond just the static layout of the environment.

These

examples give rise to the radical idea, apart from traditional
empiricists, nativists, and information-processing psychologists, that

perceptual and structural information about the environment exists
separately from what goes on in the mind.

Also, perception is not a

result of synthesizing contiguously occurring events, nor is it some
sort of computation performed by the brain.

According to Gibson, the ambient array provides much structural
information and as

a

result of this organization,

it seems

reasonable to

grant the infant basic perceptual processes which allow it to detect

information about the world.

The infant is simply a perceptual being,

and there is no need to grant the infant any conceptual knowledge or

abilities to process physical phenomena.

Neonates can not only detect

cues for depth or motion but also perceive depth and motion directly

because the information is contained in the environment and is not the
result of some sort of a computational activity in the infant

s

head.

empiricists
Such a view of perception contrasts with both traditional
to
views of perception and Piaget's view of constructing concepts

perceptual input.
perceive the world by assimilating and accommodating
In An Essav Towards a New Theory of Vision

argued that depth perception is learned by

a

(1990,

1709),

Berkelev

process of association.

convergence of the eyes
Specifically, the muscle strain caused by the
and touching objects serve
and also the associations of moving towards
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as the cues for depth.

Berkeley's account holds that tactual sensations

inform the person about depth directly; visual sensations are simply
cues of the more directly informative tactual sensations.

In contrast,

Gibson argued that there is nothing special about tactual information.
Tactual information can provide direct information about depth, but as

Gibson pointed out, so can visual cues such as binocular convergence and
texture gradients.
The development of object permanence serves as a focal point to

contrast the theories of Piaget and Gibson.
theory,

According to Piagetian

the newborn has no conception that objects continue to exist

when the infant's view of the object
of infancy,

is obstructed.

the infant learns that grabbing objects,

During the course

scanning the

environment and moving its head can lead to perceptual contact with an
object that has disappeared.

Piaget believed that the infant

hypothesizes that although objects no longer continue to exist after
they disappear, they can be brought back into existence by such actions.
As infants develop,

they realize that this primitive hypothesis fails

when they are able to overcome the A-not-B error.

In other words, when

infants are able to overcome the tendency to perseverate reaching to the

place where the object was last seen, the realization occurs that the
object has a separate, continued existence apart from the infants

sensorimotor scheme.
errors,

Piaget held that because there are so many search

because there
the infant slowly develops accurate searching and

existence of the occluded
are so few perceptual cues for the continued
object,

that objects continue
the infant must be constructing the idea

perception of the object.
to exist apart from infants' direct
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Gibson did not believe that infants have to construct knowledge
of

reality (or object permanence) the way Piaget described.

Instead,

infants must learn to distinguish between different perceptual

transformations in order to perceive whether or not an object continues
to exist.

For example, consider the different transformations of an

object fading into the background or of an object that is gradually
occluded.

Although there are no cues specifying the objects' continued

existence while it is occluded, there was important perceptual
information which existed before the object's disappearance.

For

example, when the object is gradually occluded, the infant is able to

perceive accretion/deletion information.

The problem for the infant is

not to construct the reality of the existence of objects, but according
to Gibson,

it is

"...to learn to distinguish between these two kinds of

optical transformation in order to perceive when a thing merely goes out
of sight and when it vanishes, but he

(the infant)

construct reality out of impermanent sensations."
In Piagetian theory,

infants can perceive.

does not have to
(1966,

p.

285).

experience and learning determine what

With each stage of development, the child

acquires a radically different view of the world.

In contrast,

Gibson

argues that because the neonate is able to pick up information from the
new
ambient array, one would not expect the child to arrive at radical

interpretations of the world.

Instead, the infant's perceptual system

the available
becomes increasingly refined and resonates more clearly to

This process of refinement opeia^et

information in the environment.
two ways.

same class, an
When presented with a set of objects from the

components that separate it
infant is better able to detect features and
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from objects of other classes.

Over time, the infant learns to

distinguish between features and components within

a

given class.

A second learning process is the detection of invariants in the

environment.

An infant learns to perceive that an object will have

certain properties which will remain invariant even after other
properties of the object have been transformed.

For example,

features of a face will remain the same even though
from frowning to smiling.

a

the basic

face can change

Furthermore, a second type of invariant can

be perceived, whereby a class of objects will have certain invariant

features shared by individual members, while other features may be
different.

For example, the relative position of the eyes, nose, and

mouth are invariant across faces, but the length of noses, thickness of
lips,

and shapes of eyes will vary from individual to individual within

the class of faces.
In a final departure from traditional empiricists'

accounts of

perceptual and cognitive development which hold that infants becomes
less dominated by the immediate perceptual world and more governed by a

represented world of remembered and anticipated events, the Gibsons'
theory de-emphasizes representations.

E.J. Gibson asked:

What is wrong with saying that the child is stimulus bound, and
the
that cognitive development is a liberation from these bonds by
must
One
opinion.
Piaget's
is
This
intelligence?
of
operations
attention
admit its popularity and persuasiveness, for a neonate's
its
in
events
of
kinds
does seem to be captured by a few
But the developmental change is not one of doing
environment.
stimulus
without stimulus information, it is one of seeking
(1969, p. 448).
fashion.
systematic
directed,
a
in
information

reasonable if one can
Such a view of representations seems quite
information that the
accept that the environment contains all the
depth, and continuation ot
organism needs to perceive spatial, location,

apparatus.
objects without a sophisticated cognitive

36

This view suggests

that during the course of infancy, the infant becomes increasingly

sophisticated at perceiving the invariants and affordances (the

possibility afforded to the perceive for action by an object) offered by
the environment.

There is no indication that the Gibsons deny the

emergence or the existence of cognitive activity during infancy, rather
they simply point out that it is unnecessary for the infant to rely on

cognition to gather information and perceive the world.
The Gibsonian theory of perception is important in terms of its

theoretical contributions

to-

understanding perception and to the vast

number of empirical investigations into perception of reading, piloting
airplanes,

infant development and so forth.

However,

it

is a view held

to be orthogonal to mainstream theories of perception (e.g., Gregory,

1977; Marr 1982).

Cognitive psychologists have chided the Gibsons and

their followers for their simple belief that the world can be perceived

directly without recourse to intermediate computational processes such
as Marr described.

In developmental psychology,

this position is likely

due to the current dominance of information-processing theories and the

reaction of information-processing theorists to the claims made by
Piaget regarding object permanence.

The contemporary information-

processing literature examining the emergence of the infant's conception
of the permanence of objects will be discussed.
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CHAPTER VI

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF OBJECT PERMANENCE

Baillarqeon

A_s

'

Studies of Object Permanence

s

Baillargeon and her colleagues (Baillargeon, Spelke, and
Wasserman,

1985;

a series of

Baillargeon,

1987;

Baillargeon,

1993;

1995)

embarked on

interesting studies designed to investigate young infants'

capacity for object permanence while avoiding the motoric and other

methodological problems posed by Piaget's research.
relied on

a

These studies

paradigm that did not require infants to use manual search

as an index for demonstrating object permanence.

The paradigm developed by Baillargeon et al. focused on infants'

ability to understand that one solid object cannot move through the
They reasoned that if infants are

space occupied by another object.

surprised when an object moves through the space occupied by another
object,

then infants must have some sort of object permanence because

they take into account the existence of the occluded object.
infants aged

In a series of experiments,
et al,

1985),

4

1/2-months, and

3

1/2- months

5

1/2-months (Baillargeon

(Baillargeon,

1987)

were

180° arc.
habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a

After the infants were habituated,

a

box was placed behind the screen,

events.
and the infants saw possible and impossible test

In the

the occluded box; in
possible event, the screen stopped when it reached

through a full 180° arc as
the impossible event, the screen rotated

though the box were not there.

Both
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5

1/2- and

4

1/2

-month-old infants

.

.

looked significantly longer at the impossible test event relative
to the

possible one.

In further studies,

Baillargeon (1987)

found that some

infants as young as 3.5-months would look longer at the impossible event

relative to the possible event.

Specifically, she found that infants

who were fast habituators (i.e.,

infants who took only

6

or

7

trials to

reach the habituation criterion on an inf ant -control procedure) looked

statistically longer at the impossible trials than at the possible
trials

Habituation Event

Test Events
Possible Event

Impossible Event

the infants in
Schematic drawing of the event shown to
adapted from
(Figure
1987
3aillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon
Baillargeon, 1994)
Fig.

6.1.

(
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)

According to Baillargeon, the results of these studies revealed
certain cognitive capabilities of infants that occur much earlier
than
Piaget had theorized:

"the possible event is consistent with the

expectation or belief examined in the experiment; the impossible event,
in contrast, violates this expectation.

That is,

if the infants possess

the belief being tested, they will perceive the impossible event as more

novel or surprising than the possible event, and will therefore look

reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event"
(Baillargeon,

1994,

p.

133).

Baillargeon and colleagues concluded that

the infants represented the existence of the box behind the screen,

understood that the screen could not rotate through the space occupied
by the box, expected the screen to stop in its path when it reached the

point of where contact should have been made with the box, and were

surprised when it did not stop.
Furthermore, the results cannot be explained in terms of the

infants preferring to look at the 180° rotation more than the 120°
rotation.

To demonstrate this point,

Baillargeon et al.,

(1985)

ran a

control group of infants who were habituated to the same 180° rotation
as the experimental subjects.

During the test trials, however, the

control group infants saw both the 180° rotation and the 120

with the blocks at the side of the paddle.

rotation

The analyses revealed that

compared to
there was no main effect for looking longer at one rotation
the other.
(1987),

A similar control group was carried out in Baillargeon

prevent
except that the blocks were kept away from view to

two conditions which
infants from looking at the blocks equally in the

times at the two
could have accounted for no difference in looking
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rotations

Even with this procedure, the infants looked equally at the

different paddle rotations.
The results of the moving paddle studies cannot be explained by
the hypothesis that when infants are seeing the impossible event,

they

are simply perceiving a novel test event vis-a-vis the habituation
event.

The 180° impossible test event is perceptually

familiar event,

a

and the 120° possible event is actually the more novel of the two
events; yet on average, the infants looked longer at the impossible
event.

the infants had to overcome a perceptually novel effect to

Thus,

prefer the impossible event.
the infants'

Baillargeon believed that what is guiding

looking behavior is some sort of cognitively-mediated

behavior and not a perceptually-mediated behavior.
interpretation,

it

is assumed that infants always prefer to look at a

As discussed later,

novel event.

However, with this

there are exceptions to this rule, and

given certain constraints, this assumption is not always valid.

B.

Theoretical Interpretations of Baillargeon

'

s

Data

With these results and results from other labs examining infants'

understanding of physical phenomena (e.g., Spelke, 1988a), new theories
of infant cognitive development began to emerge.

One of the most

1992).
notable theories is that of Spelke (1988a; 1988b; Spelke et al.,

Descartes,
Spelke finds her philosophical roots in the rationalism of
Kant,

properties of the mind
and Chomsky and holds that there are innate

which structure experience.
Piaget,

of
In contrast to the constructivist theory

its own foundations
Spelke believes that cognition develops from

rather than

a

foundation of perception and action.
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The initial

capacities of the mind give rise to conceptions that are appropriate
to
the experience of children and adults

connected paths)

.

(e.g.,

objects move only on

Also in contrast to Piaget,

the mind form the core of later conceptions.

initial conceptions of

During infancy and

childhood, these core conceptions are enriched and refined as knowledge

develops, but they are rarely overturned.

Piaget,

in contrast,

believed

that movement from one period to another marked a mini-Copernican

revolution in that thinking in

a

new period is a qualitatively different

way of thinking about the world.
Spelke's theory centers on two general claims about cognition in
infancy (Spelke et al.,

1992).

The Active Representation Thesis holds

that infants can represent states of the world that they no longer

perceive.

By operating on these representations,

infants come to know

about states of the world that they no longer perceived.

The Core

Representation Thesis holds that young infants' reasoning about physical

phenomena is in accord with principles that are at the heart of mature,
common sense conceptions of physical phenomena.

According to Spelke,

examples of mature common sense conceptions are continuity (objects move
only on connected paths; they do not jump from one place to another) and

solidity (objects move only on unobstructed paths; no parts of two

distinct objects coincide in times and space)

.

However,

infants

or
reasoning may not be in accord with principles that are absent from

peripheral to mature conceptions.

Examples of such peripheral

absence of
conceptions are gravity (objects move downward in the

motion abruptly and
support) and inertia (objects do not change their

spontaneously).

peripheral
Spelke calls these later two conceptions

for adaptive
because adults do not seem to have, nor require
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functioning,

full scientific knowledge of these forces.

For example,

many adults believe that unsupported objects will fall at
speed or that an object which moves freely after moving in

continue in a curvilinear motion (McCloskey, Caramazza,

&

constant

a
a

circle will

Green,

1983).

Spelke believes that knowledge of continuity and solidity are at
the core of knowledge because they rely on general principles that apply

widely to perhaps all events involving material bodies.

However,

gravity and inertia rely on reasoning that may depend on a larger number
of principles with relatively narrow applications.

Furthermore, core

knowledge is innate but scientific knowledge has to develop.

According to Spelke, Baillargeon

'

s

moving paddle studies provide

some experimental support for the active representation thesis.
et al.

(1992)

Spelke

"Young infants can represent an object that they

write:

Infants respond with heightened attention to an

no longer perceive.

impossible visible motion even when recognition of the impossibility of
the motion depends on representing the existence,

properties of a hidden object"

(p.

location,

and

609)

Recently, Baillargeon (1994) argued that infants are born not with

intuitive notions about the nature of objects in the manner that Spelke
describes, but rather with brain mechanisms which constrain the manner
in which infants reason about physical phenomena.

Baillargeon criticized Spelke'

s

Furthermore,

innate theory because infants perform

the same
differently on different tasks which presumably should require

underlying principle.
easily learn

a

Thus,

according to Baillargeon, infants more

task which more closely resembles events that are

encountered in their daily environment.
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In other words,

the easier the

task,

the younger the age at which infants will be able to detect the

impossibility of the situation.

C-

Criticisms, of Baillarqeon

'

s

View of Object Permanent

The data from the moving paddle studies are compelling and

Spelke's theory is at first glance convincing.

However, there are

several serious problems with this line of research and theorizing,

which may undermine the entire approach.

One problem is that most of

the studies used to support Spelke's innate theory hypothesis and

Baillargeon

'

s

expectancy theory are based on empirical studies which use

the habituation/dishabituation paradigm.

Normally, this paradigm is

used to test infants' ability to discriminate visual stimuli.

The

decline in attentivness over the familiarization trials is habituation.

During posthabituation trials novel and familiar stimuli are presented
to ensure that the lower level of attentiveness found on the later

familiarization trials is due to the familiarization stimulus.

Significantly greater attentiveness to the novel stimulus on the

posthabituation trials indicates that infants recognized the
stimulus as familiar.

old

The habituation /dishabituation paradigm has been

(Bornstein,
both utilized and examined extensively for the past 30 years

1985;

1992; Cohen and Gelber,

well understood phenomenon.

1975)

and habituation is

a

relatively

However, do the underlying neurological

cognitive functioning
mechanisms which support habituation also support
on a conscious level?

Are there other perceptual explanations for

paradigms that are similar to
performance on violation-of -expectation
the moving paddle paradigm?

the
Do infants even have to come into
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laboratory with prior knowledge of some phenomenon to show

distinguishing behavior between possible and impossible test events?

1

•

Neurological Underpinnings of Habituation

Most models of infant habituation rely on some sort of memory
buffer, emerging representation developing during looks, and some sort
of comparator which pits the stimulus of the sensory input with an

emerging representation in long-term memory (Olson

& Sherman,

1983).

When infants have been repeatedly exposed to an isolated presentation of
a visual stimulus,

stimulus.

they exhibit changes in their behavior toward the

Initial long visual fixation responses result in gradually

diminishing reaction as the stimulus is encountered repeatedly.
However, the fixation response often can be restored when a new and

different visual stimulus is introduced.

Because changes in behavior as

experience are generally accepted as evidence for learning

a function of

and memory processes (Bornstein, 1985; 1992), the waning and recovery of
the infant's visual fixations (habituation and novelty detection) have
\

been interpreted as indices of rudimentary cognitive processes (Cohen
Gelber,

1975)

.

&

With this interpretation in mind, researchers have used

how
the infant visual fixation paradigm as a behavioral tool to study

infants acquire and process information.
derived from
Most theories of infant visual fixation dynamics are

Sokolov's (1963) model-stimulus comparator hypothesis,

m

which

environmental stimuli
organisms attempt to construct internal models of
model more and more
Attention toward a stimulus wanes as the internal

closely "matches" the environmental stimulus.
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This type of theory

;

.

highlights how stimulus encoding and memory control the infant's visual
fixation

Mandler (1988) has argued that Baillargeon

'

s

use of the

habituation procedure is one of the few cases in which there is
declarative processing (conscious knowledge of factual information)
because the infants had to remember that the block was behind the
paddle.

To determine if habituation/dishabituation performance

indicates declarative processing, one may rely on neurological data from
primates, neurologically impaired adults, and intact adults to discover

what structures seem to mediate performance on habituation studies.
Furthermore, tasks which are normally thought of as requiring

declarative processes such as cross-modal and delayed non-matching to
sample tasks can be used to determine at what age and what underlying

structures might be involved with performance on such tasks.
In a comprehensive review of the neurological literature, Nelson
(1995)

claimed that habituation/dishabituation performance does not take

place at a declarative level but rather at

a

procedural level (i.e.,

a

level that does not require conscious processing such as riding a bike)

and furthermore, behavioral tasks which indicate declarative processing
rely on different neurological structures than

habituation/dishabituation performance.

Nelson described the robust

hippocampus and
findings that novelty preferences are mediated by the
For example, Bachevalier, Bnckson, and Hager

surrounding structures.
(1993)

presented

5-,

15-

,

and 30-day-old infant monkeys and adult

monkeys with pairs of identical stimuli for 30
given a 10

s

delay followed by two

5

s

s.

test trials.

The monkeys were then
The monkeys that

preferences.
were older than 15 days showed strong novel
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However,

monkeys from which the amygdala and hippocampus were removed did not
show any preferences.

Thus,

the hippocampus and amygdala appear to be

important structures for supporting novelty preferences.
If the hippocampus plays an important role for memory and

functions early in infancy (for reviews see, Diamond,

1990),

it

is

important to consider whether hippocampal functioning is sufficient to

make a task declarative.

According to Nelson, if habituation

performance were to reflect declarative processing, why do very young
infants who habituate and dishabituate fail on tasks that seem to

require declarative processing?
An example of a task which seems to rely on some declarative

processes is the cross-modal task whereby infants are given

stimulus

a

in one modality and given a familiar and novel stimulus in another

modality.

For example,

infants are given a stimulus to explore

haptically (without seeing the stimulus) and then are presented with
pictures of the familiarized stimulus and

a

novel stimulus.

If the

infants look longer at the novel stimulus, then it is inferred that the
infant has recognized the familiar stimulus.

This recognition is

achieved by encoding the stimulus haptically, transferring the
and
representation to another modality, maintaining this representation,

discriminating between the familiar and novel visual presentation.
In general,

it

will
is not until 6-months or older when infants

when
consistently prefer to look longer at the novel stimulus
Ruff, 1987).
habituation was through haptic exposure (Rose and

This

complicated than a simple
finding suggests that a task which is more
limbic system development.
unimodal recognition task may require more
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.

Also,

tasks which require more than mere recognition may be beyond the

capacity of younger infants who have less mature neural development.
Such further neural development might include the development of
the amygdala.

Murray and Mishkin (1985) reported that bilateral lesions

of the amygdala impair the ability to make cross-modal associations.

This finding suggests that the involvement of both the amygdala and

hippocampus are necessary when cross-modal recognition is required.

The

latter structure is for mediating novelty preferences and the former

structure is for drawing cross-modal associations.

Nelson (1994) proposed that the age of onset between the ability
to show novelty preferences during habituation studies and the ability

to demonstrate declarative forms of processing indicates that the memory

processes which utilize hippocampal functioning in early infancy differ
from those used in later infancy.

In support of this view,

researchers

have indicated that the novelty preferences of young infants might be

better characterized as reflexive (Nelson and Collins, 1991; Webster,

Ungerleider

,

Bachevalier,

1991)

and differ from the novelty preferences

demonstrated in tasks which require explicit processing in later
infancy

Nelson and Collins (1991, 1992) observed the cortical ERPs of
stimulus is
infants to determine if the number of times a particular
familiar.
presented indicates whether the stimulus is novel or

were presented with two faces equally often for

10

Infants

trials so that

events and then tested with
infants could be equally familiarized to two

three types of test events.

On 60% of the test trials, one of the faces

(the frequent-familiar
presented during familiarization was presented

event).

other familiarization face
On a random 20% of the trials, the
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was presented (infrequent-familiar event).
trials, a different face was presented.

On each of the remaining

If the

infants had fully

encoded both events during familiarization, then one might expect them
to respond equivalently to these same two faces presented during test

and to distinguish these faces from the novel ones.
The results indicated that at 4-months, infants did not

distinguish among the three types of events.

At 6-months,

they

responded both to how often the stimuli were presented and to whether
the stimuli had been seen before.

Specifically,

infants distinguished

between familiar stimuli presented frequently versus infrequently, and
the novel stimuli.

the ERP data only distinguished between

At 8-months,

novel and familiar events.

At this age,

play a role in the ERP response.

event frequency did not seem to

Nelson and Collins suggested that

until 6- to 8-months, novel preferences are simply obligatory responses
to infrequently presented events.

By 8-months however,

infants are able

to ignore how frequently a stimulus is presented and to attend simply to

whether an event is novel or familiar.

Again, at early ages, novelty

responses are reflexlike and memory inferred from novelty preferences,
differ
despite being dependent on hippocampal or related structures, may

qualitatively from memory as evaluated in the habituation studies.
the
The results of Nelson's work provide some support to
the test trials is
interpretation that infants' looking behavior during

processing)
guided by implicit (i.e., not requiring conscious

perceptually mediated processes.
Baillargeon

'

s

This is a very different idea than

guided by
interpretation that the infants' looking was

expectations about physical phenomena.

Nelson's review indicated that

an explicit
dishabituation performance is not necessarily
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(i.e.,

requiring conscious processing process and that the interpretation of
)

the data fit in well with other classifications of memory which place

habituation in a category of implicit or perceptual processing (e.g.
Schacter

,

1995

)

.

In interpreting the results of the moving paddle studies,

Baillargeon used phrases such as "understand that an object continues to
exist when occluded"

(Baillargeon et al., p. 204,

1985);

infants build

core representations during habituation and utilize this information for
"reasoning" during the test trials (Baillargeon, p. 309,

1993).

Words

like "understand" and "reasoning" are words which imply a fairly high

level of cognitive processing, yet there are never any operational

definitions of these processes, nor any explanations of how they
develop.

It may not be parsimonious to posit grand cognitive abilities

about infants' thinking when simpler perceptual explanations such as

those offered by Nelson might suffice.

2

.

Developing Expectations in the Lab

How might a process work which does not require any

prior

knowledge about a particular phenomenon on the part of the infants in
testing situation?

a

One such process might be that infants perceptually

when their
learn about events quickly during training trials and

violating event.
expectations are violated, they attend longer to the
show that infants can
There are several studies in the literature which
one, very quickly.
learn about a phenomenon, even an arbitrary

Testing whether infants can use

a

representation to guide reaching

Rochat
toward an object in the dark, Clifton,
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,

Litovsky, and Perris

(1991)

presented infants with

a large ring

and a small ring, each of

which had different sounding objects attached.

When presented with a

large ring, the infants reached with two hands to grasp it, and when

presented with

a

small object, the infants reached with one hand.

During test trials, the infants were presented with either

a large or

small ring along with its corresponding sound in total darkness.
the dark test trials

(which were interspersed by light trials)

,

During
the

infants reached appropriately for either a large or small object based
on the sound they learned that corresponded to the object.

Thus,

the

infants could quickly learn a pairing between object size and

corresponding sound and use that representation to guide their reaching
toward the object during the dark trials.
A study by Goubet and Clifton (1996)

examined the possibility of

6.5-month-olds to use a representation of a previously seen event to

guide their search behaviors. One group of infants watched a ball fall

through a vertical tube, roll down a left or right path, and land in
tray that was to either left or right of the vertical tube.

a

The ball

made a distinctive sound when it went to either the left or right path
but rolled silently to its final resting position.

These infants were

presented with these trials in both the light and dark.
light whereby
A control group was presented with an event in the
the vertical tube.
the ball came to rest in a tray at midline below

dark trials as the infants
These infants then received the same lateral
in the previous group.

Infants in this group could not have formed a

should not have searched
representation of the side trays and therefore
during dark trials.
for the balls in those locations
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results indicated that the infants in both groups would search
for the balls after the last auditory cue was heard.

However,

the

infants who saw the balls come to rest in the left/right trays during
the light events, oriented their heads and reached their hands in the

appropriate direction more often than the infants in the midline control
group.

These results indicated that infants in the experimental group

were able to use perceptual knowledge of the event and the memory of the
spatial layout of the apparatus to reach and search appropriately in the

dark when no auditory or visual clues were available.
McCall and Clifton (1996) did

a

study where 8-month-old infants

looked for hidden objects without visual feedback.

They point out that

previous studies of infants' searching can be questioned because
successful searching might occur because the infants were interested in
the opaque box hiding the object.
box,

Specifically,

while playing with the

the infants might accidentally reveal the hidden toy.

The infants

might then reach for the toy, but such search actions are not

necessarily guided by a representation of the hidden toy.
To avoid this confound, McCall and Clifton had infants search for

occluded objects in the dark.

Infants had several training trials of

then tested
reaching and uncovering hidden objects in the light and were
in the dark.

At the start of each trial,

attach a toy to

a speaker,

infants saw the experimenter

simultaneously close the cover and start

out of reach.
sound from the speaker, with the toy and cover

a

The

the covered toy to
experimenter then turned out the lights and slid

within reach of the infant.

Sound was provided to guide infants'

was turned off as soon as the
initial reaching in the dark, but sound

infants opened the cover.

reaches to
This was done so that subsequent
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.

the toy were made without any auditory or visual feedback.
the question of whether infants'

To answer

searching behavior was dependent on the

presence of a toy in the hiding place they implemented additional
trials. Before the lights were turned off,

cover closed with no toy underneath; or

infants saw either:

(2)

(1)

the

saw a toy hidden underneath

the cover but it was surreptitiously removed after the lights were

turned off.
The results indicated that 18 out of 30 infants uncovered and then

reached again to retrieve the toy during the dark trials.

Furthermore,

these infants used various strategies to retrieve the toy (e.g., holding
the cover with one hand while reaching with the other or reaching with a

single hand) which suggested to McCall and Clifton that the search

behavior was a goal-directed, means-end sequence guided by a

representation of the hidden toy.

However,

it was pointed out by the

authors that the infants searched just as frequently on trials where
there was no object and when the object was surreptitiously removed in
the dark,

thus indicating a failure to differentiate trials with and

without an object.
encode whether

a toy

This finding suggested that infants either did not

was hidden at the start of a trial, or they forgot

a toy was not placed under the cover

Finally, a study designed by Schilling and Clifton (under

revisions)

event
tested whether infants could learn about an arbitrary

distinguishing behavior when their
in a few trials and show some sort of

expectations were violated.

In this study,

infants aged 8.5- to

identical yellow balls.
months were trained on two types of events with
a yellow ball which when opened
In one event the infants were given

contained nothing.

ball, it was
After the infants had played with the
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placed inside

a

clear plastic tube which was perpendicularly inserted

into the top of a metal box.

In front of the tube and on top of the box

was a white paddle which when pressed activated a fan and forced

a

column of air up the tube which pushed the ball to the top of the tube.
In another event,

the infants were given another identical yellow ball;

however, when this ball was opened it contained another rubber ball with

colorful streamers.

When this ball was placed in side the tube and the

paddle was pressed, it remained at the bottom of the tube.
During eight training trials,

"light" balls rose and "heavy" balls

remained at the bottom of the tube when the paddle was pressed.

There

were two types of test events: consistent events were those in which the
light balls rose and the heavy balls remained at the bottom of the tube
just as in the training trials;

inconsistent events were those in which

the heavy ball rose and the light ball remained at the bottom when the

paddle was pressed.
Infants pressed longer and looked longer at the apparatus on the

inconsistent trials relative to the consistent ones.
study,

In a follow-up

infants of the same age were trained and tested with the opposite

phenomenon.

These infants learned that "heavy" balls rose and "light"

balls remained at the bottom when the paddle was pressed.

Next,

they

with the
were tested with events that were consistent or inconsistent

training events.

During inconsistent events, the light ball rose and

tube during paddle
the heavy ball remained at the bottom of the

pressing.

As in the first study,

the infants pressed longer and looked

to the consistent events.
longer at the inconsistent events relative

quickly learn about an
These results suggested that infants could
of distinguishing behavior when
arbitrary phenomenon and show some sort
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what they learned was violated.

Furthermore,

infants could learn about

an arbitrary physical phenomenon, not just those that have some sort of

special status because they are based on the laws of physics.

such as Clifton et. al.,

(1991)

Research

and Schilling and Clifton suggest that

it may be more parsimonious to posit a perceptual learning mechanism

whereby the infant forms expectations by parsing and synthesizing
contiguously occurring events in the experimental situation.

D.

Baillargeon et al.

The Familiarity Hypothesis

(1985;

Baillargeon,

1987)

carefully controlled

for novelty effects in their paradigm, but they failed to take into

account that infants show familiarity preferences in certain situations.

Researchers have generally overlooked the importance of familiarity

preferences in infant habituation studies.

Typically,

it has been

assumed that once infants have reached some sort of habituation
criterion (even though such a criterion was stipulated prior to the
testing situation and may not necessarily reflect thorough encoding),
they should look longer to a novel stimulus.

In a comprehensive review

of the literature regarding visual development, Aslin (1987)

suggested

behavior
several reasons why an infant would fail to show discriminatory

during test trials:
could
Failure to show evidence of dishabituation, however,
sufficiently
not
was
stimulus
"novel"
indicate that (a) the
increased
different from the "familiar" stimulus to elicit
(b) the
occurred;
fixation, even though discrimination had
were
stimulus
"familiar"
the
critical attributes or features of
making
thereby
phase,
habituation
not encoded during the
capable ot
discrimination impossible: (c) the infant was
fixate the cn
discriminating the two stimuli, but failed to
visual
differential
aspects of the stimuli that provided
ot
incapable
fact
in
was
information; or (d) the infant
(p. 3.
stimuli,
two
the
between
discriminating any difference
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In this passage it is never discussed that infants might not
look

longer to the novel stimulus because of some sort of familiarity

preference.

That infants look longer to a familiar stimulus than a

novel one after some degree of habituation is not a new idea.

study by Weizmann, Cohen, and Pratt

placed in

a

4-week-old infants were

(1971),

crib with a mobile for 30 minutes daily for

and 8-weeks, the infants were presented with
familiar one.

At 6-weeks,

In a

a

a

At 6-

month.

novel mobile and a

the infants looked longer to the familiar

mobile, and at 8-weeks, they looked longer to the novel mobile.

Weizmann et al

.

suggested that both manners of responding were

indicators of recognition.
The intersensory integration research done by Spelke (1976) has

relied on infants to exhibit

a

month-old infants were shown two movies side-by-side.
a

One movie showed

woman who hid her face with her hands and then uncovered

"hello baby, peekaboo."

Four-

type of a familiarity preference.

In the other movie,

moved up and down and rhythmically struck

a

a

it

and said

hand held a stick which

piece of wood.

In the

center, between the two films, was a sound source which played
that corresponded to one of the films.

a

sound

Most infants looked longer to

the screen which matched the appropriate sound source.

The infants

visual
could have preferred to look longer at the novel combination of
infants' ability to
and auditory stimuli, and the same interpretation of

integrate sight and sound could have been made.

Rose and Ruff

(1987)

have generally found that
reported that studies of cross-modal abilities

preferences.
infants younger than 6-months show familiarity
to understanding the
During the 1980's, much research was devoted

during habituation.
nature of information-processing of infants
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A

specific line of this research focused on the time-course of processing
for schema-completion during habituation (Hunter, Ross, & Ames,
Rose, Gottfried, Melloy-Carminar

Koopman,

1983;

&

,

Bridger,

see also Hunter & Ames,

1982; Hunter,

Ames,

1988 for a review).

1982;
&

An

interesting finding from this research is that, early in habituation,
infants attend longer to a familiar stimulus relative to a novel one and

show

a

preference for a novel stimulus only after

habituation has occurred.

a

sufficient amount of

For example, Hunter et al.

(1982)

investigated the playing time of one-year-old infants with familiar and
novel toys.

One group of infants were allowed to play with the toys

until their playing time had decreased to meet

criterion for habituation.
time with the familiar toy.

a

rather stringent

The other group were given a shorter playing
It was predicted that the infants who had

been habituated would play longer with the novel than the familiar toys.
The other group would play longer with the familiar toy because they
As predicted,

have not finished processing it.

played longer with

the habituated infants

a novel toy and infants given less familiarization

claim
time played longer with a familiar toy.. The finding supports the
to
that short familiarization times can lead to longer attention

familiar stimulus.
Gottfried,
A familiarity preference was also found by Rose,

stimuli on
Melloy-Carminar, and Bridger (1982) who presented static

a

4.5-, and 6.5-months.
screen for 30 seconds to infants aged 3.5-,

and older infants showed
Younger infants showed familiarity preferences

novelty preferences; there was

a

general progressive shift for a

preference with age.
familiarity preference to a novelty
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Rose et al.

. .

argued that all infants show

f amil

iarity preferences given a

sufficiently short familiarization time for
In a follow-up

study by Rose et al.

a

given age.

(1982),

3.5- and 6.5-month-

olds were given varying amounts of familiarization times and then were

presented with novel and familiar stimuli.
who experienced

5

Six-and-a-half-month-olds

seconds of familiarization showed a familiarity

preference; those who experienced 10 seconds of familiarization showed
no preference; and infants who experienced 15 seconds of familiarization

showed a novelty preference.
f amiliarity-to-novelty

The

3

.

preference trends; however, they needed

accumulated familiarization times of
this trend.

5-months-olds showed the same

10,

20,

and 30 seconds to exhibit

These results indicate that infants show

preference after experiencing
familiarization time.

a

a

familiarity

sufficiently short amount of

This familiarity preference can be used as an

index of the state of information-processing at the time of the test

trials
In a review of the habituation literature, Hunter and Ames

(1988)

found that researchers reported both significant familiarity preferences

and novelty preferences in the literature.

Infants show a significant

familiarity preference when they were given a sufficiently brief
exposure to

a

and
stimulus and when they were sufficiently young. Hunter

show a familiarity
Ames claimed that infants of all ages initially

duration of such
preference and then a novelty preference, and the

complexity and age of the
preferences are a function of both stimulus
infant
infants of all ages will
According to Hunter and Ames (1988),

show

a

short habituation
familiarity preference given a sufficiently
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time and a sufficient amount of task difficulty.

proposed that infants in Baillargeon et al.
(1987)

Therefore,

it

is

and Baillargeon

(1985)

looked longer at the impossible event not because of some

inferred violation of physics on the part of the infants, but rather
because it was perceptually familiar.

The infants did not have enough

exposure time during the habituation phase to thoroughly encode the 180°

movement of the moving paddle.
the familiar event,

During test trials,

infants preferred

to the 120° novel event.

This familiartity hypothesis seems plausible when one considers
the data of the 3.5-month-old infants who looked significantly longer at

Only the fast habituators (i.e., infants who

the impossible event.

habituated in

6

or

7

trials) preferred the 180° event; that is,

infants

who had the least amount of exposure time looked longer at the
impossible event.

In Baillargeon et al

(1985),

.

the 5.5-month-old

infants reached habituation in 7.32 trials (as defined by a looking time

which had three consecutive trials with

a

mean looking time of 50% or

less than the mean looking time of the first three trials)

same habituation criterion, Baillargeon (1987)

found that

.

Using the

4.5-month-old

infants reached the habituation criterion in 6.62 trials.
However, one cannot be sure to what extent the infants were

habituated using Baillargeon
have been looking for

a

'

s

decrement criterion.

The infants may

long time on the first three trials because of

not necessarily because
the novel situation of the testing room, but

occurring
they were actually attending to the event

m

front of them.

inflate their looking time
This heightened attention could artifactually
on the first few trials

(see Bernstein,

••styles" of habituation by infants).
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1985,

for a review of different

The data on the graphs reported

m

'

the two papers show smooth habituation slopes suggesting that the

infants were habituated.

"self-selection."

However,

these data may be the result of

The first three trials that reach this decrement

criterion may not indicate complete habituation.

It is

possible that

the infants reached this criterion by chance (e.g., Bogartz,

Bornstein,

1985)

.

1965;

For example, an infant may have had a lengthy look

during one of the first three trials which increased the initial score.
During one of the next three trials, this infant may have been

distracted and did not look at the stimuli, which decreased the average
for that block of trials.

In this case,

the infant would be considered

habituated, however it is questionable whether the infant really had an

opportunity to thoroughly encode the stimuli.
The familiarity hypothesis implies that infants

cognitively mediated, but rather guided by

a

'

looking is not

simpler perceptual process.

Specifically, the familiarity hypothesis holds that with the habituation

criterion of Baillargeon et al

.

,

(1985)

and Baillargeon (1987), the

infants may not have had enough time to thoroughly encode the

habituation event.

Therefore, during t^st trials, the infants attended

the
longer to the 180° impossible event than to the 120° event because

former was perceptually more familiar.

F

Ann!

i

Paddle
cation of the Familia rity Hypothesis to the Moving

Studies

results in Baillargeon
Can the familiarity hypothesis explain

s

control groups showed no mam
moving paddle studies, when infants in
If the familiarity hypothesis
effect for the 180° or the 120° movement?
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is correct,

all infants should look longer to the 180° event because it

is presumably familiar.

However,

there is no such main effect.

Interestingly, there is

Event interaction in Baillargeon
(1985),

a 2

Order (180°,

pair of test trials) x

2

in all analyses of the two studies,

'

s

studies.

120° first)

Event

(180°,

x

curious Order x

a

In Baillargeon et al.

Trial (first, second, third

3

120° event)

mixed analysis of

variance (ANOVA) with order as the between-subject factor was conducted.
The results indicated that the control infants looked significantly
at the apparatus during the first pair of test trials at the

longer

180° event relative to the 120° event when the 180° event occurred

first,

F

(

1

,

88)

17.23, p <

=

.001.

However, this interaction did not

exist when the infants saw the 120° event first, F(l,88)
.28.

1.17, p

=

The data are not plotted by order, but from the magnitude of the
(M 180°

overall difference between the 180° and the 120° event
29 s;

=

M 120° event = 18

s)

event

=

and considering the size of the F-ratio, this

difference is large.
A similar result was also found in Baillargeon (1987)

Baillargeon used

2

Condition (experimental, control) x
impossible/180 0 event first) x

(possible/ 112° event,
(first,

second,

third,

fourth test pair) x

2

Event

4

2

Order

Test Pair

(possible/112 0

,

between-subject
impossible / 180°) mixed ANOVA with Condition and Order as

variables.

whereby
There was a significant Order x Event interaction,

the infants who saw the impossible/180

0

event first looked longer at the

0
event.
impossible/ 180° event than at the possible/112

saw the possible/112

0

When the infants

preference for
event first, they showed no overall

one event over the other.

It

for this
is not clear what the means are

control groups because the data
interaction within the experimental and
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were collapsed across the two conditions.

Therefore, this result is

only suggestive that the infants may have looked longer at the 180°
event in the control condition when this event appeared first.

These results have implications for both the familiarity

hypothesis and Baillargeon
a familiar test event

'

s

(i.e.,

theory.

Specifically, when the infants saw

the 180° event)

first on the first pair of

test trials, they exhibited a familiarity preference for the familiar

event rather than a novelty preference for a novel event (i.e., 112°
event)

.

This finding lends some support to the familiarity hypothesis

because the infants looked longer at a familiar event.

However, when

they saw a novel event first, the infants did not show a preference.

This finding contradicts the familiarity hypothesis and supports

Baillargeon

'

s

theory that it is not the event itself which elicits

looking, but rather the cognitive novelty of the 180° impossible event.

These interactions suggest that further controls need to be implemented
to help rule out the possibility that infants'

looking on the test

trials might be governed by a familiarity preference.
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CHAPTER VII

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION OF HABITUATION EVENTS AND AGE

A.

Introduction

The following experiment was designed to examine the role that

habituation trials may play in the results described by Baillargeon et
al.,

and Baillargeon (1987).

(1985)

Specifically, the effects of

lengthening the familiarization trials, changing the type of

familiarization event, and age were examined using
groups of 4-month-olds,

1

group of 6-month-olds).

4

conditions

(3

All groups were run

simultaneously with 4-month-old infants randomly placed into one of the
testing conditions.
The time-course of information processing was observed by using a

paradigm similar to Baillargeon (1987)
Baillargeon

'

s

experiment,

.

In Group A,

which replicated

infants were given seven 180° familiarization

trials and tested with 180° impossible and 112° possible test events. It
is

hypothesized that the infants would look longer at the 180

event.

There are two explanations for this prediction.

test

Baillargeon

it
claimed that the infants would look longer at the 180° event because

is impossible.

Alternatively, the familiarity hypothesis proposes that

event and would
infants have not completely encoded the familiarization

look longer at a perceptually familiar event.

Group B examined the

trials (i.e., twelve
effect that increasing the number of habituation
180° habituation events)

test trials.

has on infants'

looking preferences during the

the infants
According to the familiarity hypothesis,
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should have completely encoded the familiarization event and
should

therefore prefer to look longer at

a

According to Baillargeon

the infants should look longer to the

180

'

s

theory,

perceptually novel 112° test event.

impossible event because it is still impossible despite the number

of habituation trials.

Group C examined the effect that reversing the habituation event
(i.e.,

habituating to seven 112° events) has on looking times to the

possible and impossible test events.

The prediction derived from the

familiarity hypothesis is that infants have not had enough trials to
encode the familiarization event and would look longer at the 112°

perceptually familiar event.
Baillargeon

'

s

theory,

Again,

it can be

inferred from

that the infants should look longer to the 180°

event because it is still impossible despite the type of habituation

trials
Finally, Group D examined the effect that manipulating age has on

looking times to the two test events.

In this experiment 6-month-old

infants were given seven 180° habituation events.

According to the

familiarity hypothesis, 6-month-old infants who are presumably faster

information processors, would look longer to a perceptually novel test
event.

In contrast,

Baillargeon

s

'

theory would predict that the infants

should look longer at the impossible event.
If the results turn out as hypothesized,

these data would provide

behavior is
compelling evidence that what guides the infants' looking

with relatively
perceptually based and can be explained parsimoniously
which underlie the
well understood information-processing capabilities

habituation.

hold that
This idea contradicts early theories which

event on the test trials
infants look longer at the 180° impossible
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because it violates an inferred law of physics and is therefore

cognitively novel.

Finally,

if the data support the familiarity

hypothesis, then researchers may want to focus greater attention on

perceptual processes and how these processes underlie the development of

cognitive activity which emerges during the course of later infancy.
However,

if it is found that infants of both age groups and

habituation groups look longer at the impossible event, then this would
provide strong support for Baillargeon

'

overcome the tendency to look longer at

interpretation that infants can

s

a

perceptually novel event and

attend to the cognitively-inferred aspects of test trial events.

Such a

result would support the theories of Spelke and Baillargeon and that

manipulating the information processing demands on the infants through
habituation does not affect whether or not infants look longer at the
impossible event.

Method

B.

1

.

Participants

In Group A,

twenty infants

months

or

-

males,

(8

10 days

13

females) who were between

(M = 4 mo,

the ages of

4

the study.

All parents reported that at birth,

+

fullterm, healthy and heavier than 2500 g.

3

days) participated in

their infants were

An additional

fussiness
tested and eliminated from the Group-Because of

experimenter error
In Group B,

of

4

months

+

or

4

infants were

(3)

and

(1)

twenty infants
-

10 days

(M =

65

(7

3

males,

13

females)

between the ages

mo 27 days) participated.

An

.

additional

infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness

6

and experimental error
In Group C,

of

4

months

additional

or

+

(2)

twenty infants (10 males,
10 days

-

(4)

(M = 4

mo

8

10

females)

between the ages

days) participated.

An

infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness

4

Finally,
the ages of

.

6

An additional

in Group D,

months
4

+

or

twenty infants (10 males,
-

10 days

(M =

6

mo,

7

10

females)

(4)

between

days) participated.

infants were tested but dropped because of fussiness

and experimental error

(3)

(1).

All infants were tested at the Infant Studies Laboratory at Tufts

University in Medford, MA.

Names of parents and infants were obtained

from public birth records at local city halls.

participants were mailed
the lab procedures.

a

The parents of potential

letter that explained the general nature of

Interested parents were requested to mail an

enclosed card to indicate that they were willing to become part of a
participant pool.

All potential participants were drawn from this pool.

When the infants approached the appropriate ages,
scheduled.

a lab

visit was

All parents were required to sign a consent form that had a

written description of the procedure.

After the testing session, all

given an
parents were debriefed regarding the hypotheses of the study,

opportunity to ask questions, and the infants were given

a

t-shirt and

certificate for their participation.

2

.

Stimuli and App aratus

to that used in Baillargeon
The stimuli and apparatus were similar
(1987)

.

The moving paddle was a white,
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foam-core paddle 20.3 cm

18.4 cm high that was situated on a black box 38.1 cm long x 10.8
cm

high x 22.9 cm wide.

The block (18 cm long x 10 cm high x

1

cm.

thick)

had black and white checkerboard stripes and was large enough so that
the paddle would hit it if

the paddle progressed any further than 112°.

In addition, movement of the block was controlled by an experimenter who

used

lever to raise and lower the block.

a

experimenter pulled
of the apparatus.

a

To raise the block,

the

string which lifted the block from the rear base

To lower the block,

the experimenter released the

string and the block rested flush with the apparatus.
was able to raise and lower the block while positioned

center-panel (from the infants' point of view) of

which sat on the same table as the apparatus.

a

This experimenter

behind the rear

four-sided screen

There was a small hole in

the lower right corner of the rear center screen, through which an

experimenter could see the movement of the paddle.

Attached on either

side of the center panel were two blinders which prevented the infants

from seeing the experimenters and the rest of the lab room.

In front of

the infants was a curtain which could be opened and closed by the

experimenter behind the rear center screen.
closed,

When the curtain was

infants could no longer see the apparatus.

The movement of the paddle was controlled by a Cybermation SCK2000 controller kit.

The controller card was mounted underneath the
The moving paddle was run by a 12-volt

black base of the moving paddle.
AC Center Tap,

4

motor.
amp transformer which powered a 12-volt stepper

the parameters of the
Software for an IBM compatible computer allowed

paddle movement to be set
speed and the degrees of arc of the moving

prior to the start of a trial.

The movement of the moving paddle was

of potential experimenter
controlled by a computer to avoid problems
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bias and/or error resulting from manually turning handcranks to the beat
of a metronome as was done in the research by Baillargeon (1987).

The length of trials and looking data were recorded by a computer.

The software cued the experimenter when to begin a trial, when to end
trial, and when a specific number of trials had been reached.

testing sessions were videotaped by

a Sony

8

All

Camcorder video camera which

recorded a direct view of the infants' gazes to the paddle.
were copied from the

a

All data

mm camcorder tape onto VHS VCR tapes with

a date-

timer image superimposed on every frame in .01 second.

3

.

Procedure -Overview

The infants were seated in a car seat during the entire procedure.

The parents were seated next to the infants to the right of the right
blinder.

This arrangement allowed parents and infants to see each othe*

without permitting parents to view the apparatus.

Before the

with
habituation trials started, parents were reminded not to interact
the infants while the curtain was open.

After a trial ended and the

pat or talk to
curtains were closed, parents were permitted to gently

a

fussy infant during the intertrial period.
procedure.
Two experimenters participated in this

One

monitor and
experimenter scored looking time from a video

initiated and

and end of a trial.
terminated the paddle movement at the beginning

A

the curtains at the beginning and
second experimenter opened and closed

end of a trial.

lowered the block
This experimenter also raised and

attached to the apparatus.

the
This block served as the obstacle in

the test trials.
path of the moving paddle during
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A trial started

with a single button press on the PC keyboard which in turn, activated
the moving paddle to begin its arc.

Once a trial began, the

experimenter was able to begin scoring using

a

button press that was

connected to the Macintosh computer.

4

Procedure

.

For Groups

A,

B,

and

C,

4-month-old infants were randomly placed

into one of the experimental groups.

The group with the 6-month-olds

was run simultaneously with the three 4-month-old groups.

Within all of

the four testing groups infants were randomly placed into one of two

groups with different testing orders.

Half of the infants (n

in a group which viewed the 180° test event first,

second,

half

112° test event third,

(n =

10)

=

10)

were

112° test event

The other

and 180° test event fourth.

experienced test trials in just the opposite order.

The

computer alerted the experimenter as to what type of trial to run (i.e.,
180° event,

112° event with block,

180° with block).

The onset and length of trials for all groups is similar to that

found in Baillargeon (1987)

.

A trial began with a

.1

second

(s)

fixation to the paddle and continued until the infants accumulated

consecutive seconds of looking time to the paddle.
away for

2

accumulated 60

s

,

45°/s.

;

Otherwise, a trial ended after the infant

of looking time to the paddle.

During the 180-degree habituation trials
D)

If the infant looked

met
consecutive seconds after the accumulation criterion was

then the trial ended.

s,

5

(as

used

m

Groups

A,

B,

(without a block) at a rate o£
the paddle moved through a 180° arc

During the

4

test trials,
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the paddle moved through a 180° arc

(with the block present) at the rate of 45°/s,
(with the block present) at the same speed.

and through a 112° arc
In Group C,

where the

infants were habituated to a paddle movement of 112°, the paddle moved
at a rate of 45°/s.

During the test trials, the movement and speed of

the paddle remained the same as the test events in the other

experimental groups.
The presentation of trials is slightly different from the study of

Baillargeon (1987).
paddle,

Because the computer controlled the movement of the

there were no pauses while the direction of the paddle movement
Furthermore, because the block was resting on the rear of

was changed.

the base on which the paddle was attached instead of being raised and

lowered on

a

platform as in the study of Baillargeon (1987), there was

no need to stop the paddle at 45° to raise and lower the block.

Instead, one experimenter was able to raise and lower the block by

simply pulling and releasing
the block.

a

string attached to an arm on the side of

The absence of pauses should reduce any potential

disruptions to the infants that might interfere with information-

processing during the trials.

5

.

\

Scoring

times.
All trials from all participants were scored several

Initially,

session.
all infants were scored live during the testing

computer controlled trial
Online scoring was necessary because the

length based on accumulated looking time.

One experimenter watched a

gaze and the apparatus.
video monitor which captured the infant's
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This

experimenter who was not blind to condition was able to hit keys on

a

keyboard which recorded the looking time of each gaze.
All participants' data were also scored offline from videotapes.

Two independent scorers used a VCR that had a shuttle control to score
the videotapes.

This shuttle enabled the scorer to stop the tape at

precisely the point where

a look

began and to advance the tape to the

point where the look had terminated.
of trial being presented (i.e.,

Each scorer was blind to the type

112° or 180°)

because only the first 45°

and last 45° of the paddle movement was videotaped.
The scorers began each trial to make sure the infants had

accumulated

5

consecutive seconds of looking time to the apparatus at

the start of each trial.

began

a

Each scorer marked the time that an infant

directed gaze to the apparatus, advanced the tape, and marked
The scorers

the time when the infants stopped looking at the apparatus.

then advanced the tape through the non-looking interval to make sure
that

consecutive seconds had not elapsed.

2

This scoring procedure was

continued for each looking and non-looking period on every trial for
each infant

\

.

If a scorer

found that an infant had not accumulated

seconds at the start of

a trial,

'

s

data were eliminated if

consecutive

the infant's data were dropped.

a

One

Also, an

infant's data were dropped in Group D for this reason.
infant

5

scorer found that an infant had

actually looked away from the apparatus for more than

2

consecutive

terminate the trial.
seconds and that the experimenter had failed to

Infant's data were dropped from Group A
this reason.
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(n =

1)

and Group B

(n

=

2)

tor

The data from the two scorers were then compared.

more than a

2

When there was

second difference in accumulated looking time between the

two scorers for a particular trial, a third person scored the trial.

If

there was no agreement between any two scorers at this point (using the
2

second rule), the subject's data would have been eliminated.

This did

not occur for any of the infant's data.

The data for all of the trials for both scorers for each

experiment were analyzed using Pearson's correlation coefficient.

In

Group-A (as in all of the other groups), 100% of the trials scored by
one scorer was in agreement with another scorer (i.e., within

2

seconds)

for accumulated looking time/trial; r = .96; Group-B had an interrater

agreement of .98; Group-C had an interrater agreement of .96; finally,
Study D had an interrater agreement of .98.

C.

Results and Discussion

The data were analyzed in two parts.

Initial analyses examined

the level of habituation achieved by infants in the four groups.

The

second part of the analyses described dishabituation and discrimination

between the two types of test trials.
summarized in Figures 1-4.
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The data from Groups A-D are

Group A
L

o
o
*

40“

TEST TRIALS
35-

h

2

30

-

q

25msmh

20 -

15-

iosooraw

5D
S

T1

Fig. 7.1.

during

7

T2

(Group A)

T3

T4

T5

T6

T7

180 112

180

112

Four-month-old infants' looking time (in seconds)

180° habituation and

4

test trials.
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Group B

(Group B) Four-month-old infants' looking time (in seconds)
during 12 180° habituation and 4 test trials.
Fig. 7.2.
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Group C
Tj

40“1

HABITUATION TRIALS

O
0
K

TEST TRIALS

1

N
G
T
I

M
E
S

E
C

o
N
D
S

Fig.

7.3.

during

7

(Group C) Four-month-old infants'
4 test trials.

112° habituation and
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looking time (in seconds)

Group D

Fig. 7.4

during

1

.

7

(Group D) Six-month-old infants' looking time
180° habituation and 4 test trials.
.

(in seconds)

Habituation Data

Baillargeon (1987) operationalized habituation as a decrease in
looking time to the habituation stimulus that has a mean looking time of
time for
50% or less for three consecutive trials than the mean looking

the first three habituation trials.

The data from the four testing

many infants
groups in the current Experiment were examined to see how

achieved this habituation criterion.
7.1.
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The data are summarized

m

Table

s

.

Table 7.1

Number of infants who reached Baillargeon s (1987) habituation criterion
in Group A (7-180°, 4-month-olds), B (12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7-112°
4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6-month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups).
'

Group

Number Reached
Habituation
Criterion

A

B

C

D

13

13

9

14

Considering this experiment used a fixed number of trials, it is
not surprising that not all of the infants reached Baillargeon

decrement criterion within
fixed number of trials,

7

trials in Groups A-D.

'

However, despite the

it is surprising that only 13 of 20

infants in

Group B reached the decrement criterion considering that they had

12

habituation trials presumably providing sufficient time to thoroughly
encode the event
To further investigate the habituation of the different groups, a

one-way between groups ANOVA was performed to determine if the

accumulated habituation times differed between groups.

It was

expected

accumulated
that the infants in Groups A and C would have equivalent
and had
habituation times because both groups used 4-month-old infants

habituation trials.

It was also expected that the infants

m

7

Group B

time during
would have significantly more accumulated looking

they had
habituation than the other three groups because
trials.

Finally,

12

habituation

D would have
it was expected that infants in Group

77

,

,

.

significantly less accumulated looking time (even though they had

7

habituation trials) because they were 6-months-old and should encode the

habituation event more quickly. In fact, the ANOVA indicated that
infants in all four experiments did not have accumulated looking times
that were significantly different, F

(

76)

3

=

.16,

n£ (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2
Accumulated habituation times for Group: A (7-180°, 4-month-olds)
(12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7-112° 4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups)

Group

F

(

76)

3

=

.16,

M
SD

B

BCD

A

Accumulated
Looking Time

,

127.6
67.4

145.2
111.7

130.1
80.9

135.8
81.5

ns

Finally, to indicate the degree of decrement in looking during the

course of habituation, the average of the first three trials was

compared to the average of the last
A,

C,

& D

thrtee trials.

The infants in Groups

showed significant decrease in looking between the first three

and last three habituation trials.

However, the infants in Group-B did

three and
not show a significant decrement in looking between the first
last three habituation trials.

Because of the low level of looking

reach the
during the initial trials it would be very difficult to

habituation criterion (see Table 7.3).

The lack of a smooth downward

infants showing a
habituation slope is also due to 16 of the 20

fluctuating pattern (i.e.,

a

bimodal function that has at least two

one peak higher and/or lower
reversals of direction and has at least one
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16

than the habituation criterion) of looking during the
habituation
trials.

However,

it

is still possible that they encoded that

habituation event but any results results from this group need to be
interpreted with caution.

Table 7.3

Decline in looking (in seconds) during habituation as measured by
difference in average of first three and last three habituation trials
for Group:
A (7-180°, 4-month-olds), B (12-180°, 4-month-olds), C (7112° 4-month-olds), and D (7-180°, 6-month-olds) (n = 20 in all groups).

Group

First Three Trials

A

M

26.2
14.1

11.8
6.4

5.1*

t (19)

M
SD

B

14

.

9

.

10.2
11.4
1.4

t (19)

M

C

13.6
10.1

23.2
16.7
2.9**

t (19)

M
£D

D

10.9
8.9

26.6
14

.

6.3**

£(19)
*

£

**

2

.

.05

<

£

Last Three Trials

<

.01

Dishabit uation Data

whether the
The initial analysis of the test trial data determined
infants showed any evidence of dishabituation.
test,

Using a paired means £-

the last two
the data were examined by taking the average of

the four test trials
habituation trials and comparing that with each of
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(i.e.,. 180°-1,

112°-2

,

180°-2,

of each type of test trial
It was

112°-2)

individually and with the average

180° and 112° test events).

(i.e.,

expected that there would be no dishabituation for the 4-

month-old infants who received
because it was thought that
be thoroughly habituated.

7

7

180° and 112° habituation trials

habituation trials would not be enough to

For the infants who received the 12 180°

habituation trials, it was expected that they would show significant

dishabituation to the perceptually novel event (i.e., the 112° test
event) because 12 trials was thought to be enough to sufficiently encode

the 180° habituation event.

received the

7

Finally,

for the 6-month-old infants who

180° habituation trials,

it was

expected that they would

dishabituate to the perceptually novel event (i.e., 112° test event)
because

7

180° event

habituation trials should be enough to completely encode the
(see Table 7.4).
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Table 7.4

Comparison of the average of the last two habituation trials with 180°
and 112° test events in seconds for Groups A-D.

Test Event

180°-1

Last 2
Trials

Group M
A
SD

10

.

12. 91
13 6
64

,7

5..95

M

9

£D

9..5

,

.54

C

11 .49
10 .57

SD

*

**

8. 94

13

.

9

.

-1. 48

27
1. 07

7

.

15..85

5..95

4 .39

19 .76

4 .15

.

04

7 .64

16 .5
14 .93

1

.41

-1 .45

8

.73

8
-

1

2

.

51
12.,69
14 .39
.

45*
.

*r

-1..51

.

7 .72

13 .06

8 .0

9 .27

14 .67

6

.92

11 .64

-1 .28

,

1

.78*

7 .88

.91
9 .38
- .66

6. 93

.

,

.87** -1 .97

2

9

.86
.

.

9. 71

-1. 1

4 .85
.

112°

52
98

9..47

.

£(19)

09
97

10..83

.

8

.

180°

6..28

8 .23

.45
7 .41

M

.

9

112°-2

7 ,01

.

M
SD

14

2

.

1

1. 5

£.(19)

D

.

9

.

£ (19)

180°-2

10 41

.

t (19)

B

112°- 1

10 .35
.25

14,.73

-

.51

1

.81*

9

.45

8

13 .82

6

.34
.88
.06

- .3

9

8
-

.68
.

1

.61

p < .05
p < .005
\

As expected,

events (Group

A)

the 4-month-old infants who were habituated to

/

180

did not show any significant differences between the

average of the last two habituation trials and any of the test trials,
£(19), ns for all comparisons.
(Group
The 4-month-old infants who had 12 habituation trials

looked an average of 9.54
trials and showed

a

s

(SD = 9.5 s)

B)

during the last two habituation

different pattern of looking during the test trials.

time to the familiar event
During the first two test trials, the looking
(i.e.,

180°- 1

significance

)

continued to decline to
(M 180°-1 = 7.01

s,

81

£D

=

a

level approaching statistical

6.28

s,

£(19)

=

1.5,

p

=

-07)

.

although the looking time to the novel 112° event was statistically
equal to the last two habituation trials
s,

£.(19)

=

.04,

ns..

(M 112°-1

9.47

=

SD = 4.39

£(19)

s,

2£

,

10.83

=

The pattern of declining looking time to the

familiar event continued during the second test phase
s,

s

=

2'.

87

,

p

.005)

<

(M 180°-2

4.85

=

There was a significant

.

increase in looking time to the novel event in the second test phase
112°-2 = 15.85

s,

SD

=

19.76

s,

=

£(19)

-1.97, p <

.05)

Overall,

infants in this group looked significantly less to familiar event
180° = 5.95 s,

SD = 4.15

£(19)

s,

=

2.45, q_<

.05),

SD

=

14.39

s,

£(19)

=

the
(M

and they showed a

trend of looking significantly longer to the novel event
s,

(M

(M 112°

=

12.69

-1.51, p = .07).

These data suggest that the infants in Group B continued to

habituate to the familiar 180° test event during test phases
and dishabituated to the novel 112° test event.

1

and

2,

This is an interesting

pattern of looking because these infants only showed

a 28%

decline in

looking time from the average of the first three habituation trials to
the last three habituation trials.
it

This finding suggests that perhaps

is not necessarily the decline in looking time or the accumulated

amount of looking time during the habituation trials which is important
important.
to show dishabituat ion but that the number of trials may be
It

is not clear why this might be the case,

but it may be that by

start of
organizing their attention to the apparatus many times at the

attention to thoroughly
each trial may have forced the infants to focus

encode the 180° habituation events.
The infants who had
an average of 11.49

trials.

s

7

112° habituation events

(SD = 10.57 s)

(Group C)

looked for

during the last two habituation

180° events at test
These infants looked less at the novel

82

(M =

.

8.0

SD

s,

-

6.92

not significant)

s,

£.(19)

=

1.81, e <

.05),

and showed a trend (although

of looking longer at the familiar 112° test event when

compared to the last two habituation trials
=

t (19)

(M = 14.73

s,

££)

11.64

=

s,

-1.28, p > .05)

The infants in Group' C showed an overall significant decline in

looking to the novel event as compared to the average of the last two

habituation trials.

As expected, both within and overall the two test

phases, the infants did not look longer to the perceptually familiar
event.

The looking times to the 112° event indicated that the infants

were still interested in processing the familiar event and disinterested
in processing the novel event.

Such data suggested the infants did not

move on to another event until

a

previous event has been processed.

Finally, the 6-month-old infants who were habituated to
(Group D)

events looked an average of 8.45

s

(SD = 7.41 s)

7

180°

However,

.

they failed to show any dishabituation or continued habituation to any
The 6-month-olds infants'

of the test events.

phases seemed to have declined to

a

looking during the test

plateau, and the infants looked to

the moving paddle only because there was nothing else at which to look.
It may be possible that at 6-months,

7

trials and the particular trial

criterion used in the current experiments may bore these infants.

3

Test Event Discrimination Data

.

groups
To examine if infants in the various experimental

discriminated between test events, a
x

2

Test Pair (TP

1

or TP

2)

x

2

2

Event

Order (180° or 112° event first)
(180° or 112°)

order as the between variable) was performed.
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mixed ANOVA (with

In Group A

m

which 4-

month-old infants were habituated to
edited that

F

(

1

,

180° trials,

the analysis

infants did discriminate the two events by looking longer

to the 180° test event

9.71 s),

7

18)

=

(M =

6.96,

13.5

p <

s)

.02,

than to the 112° test event

MSE

=

41.93

(see Figure 7.1,

(U

p.

73.).

Additionally, there was a Test Pair x Trial Type x Order interaction

whereby infants who had the 180° event first (order

1)

had a interaction

of trial type x test pair, whereas infants who saw the 180° event second

(order

2)

did not (see Figure 5).

Order

1

(180°

Order 2 (112°

First)

First)

Looking
Time
Seconds

Fig.

7.5.

Interaction of Test Pair x Trial ’Type x Order for Group

A.

Group
Even though the infants did not show any dishabituation in
A,

looked
they did discriminate between the two test events and

event.
significantly longer to the 180° familiar (and "impossible")

This finding was predicted by both Baillargeon

'

s

cognitive novelty

the 180° event because it
theory (i.e., the infants looked longer to

hypothesis (i.e., the
violates the laws of physics) and the familiarity

because it was perceptually
infants looked longer to the 180° event
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familiar to the event not completely encoded during the habituation
trials)

.

However,

interaction,

looking at the Test Pair x Trial Type x Order

is clear that the infants who saw the 180° event first

it

were inflating the looking time to the 180° test event and deflating the
looking time to the 112° test event.

It

is not apparent why this

interaction occurred, however it is similar to interactions found in

Baillargeon et al
In Group B,

.

(1985)

and Baillargeon (1987).

4-month-old infants looked significantly longer at the

perceptually novel 112° test event after receiving 12 180° habituation
trials

(see Figure 7.2,

event first) x

2

Specifically, the

66).

p.

Test Pair

(

1

or

2

)

x

2

Event

(with order as a between subject variable)

significantly longer at the 112° possible
to the 180° impossible
.05,

(

MSE = 157.39).

(M =

5.95

s)

2

Order (180° or 112°

(180° or 112°)

mixed ANOVA

revealed that infants looked
(M =

12.69

test event, F(l,

s)

18)

test event than
=

5.76, p <

The analysis also indicated that infants looked

longer to the 112° test event during the second test pair than during
first test pair, F(l,

18)

=

8.58, p <

85

.05,

MSE

=

41.58

(see Figure 7.6).

.

L

20 -r

0
0
K
1

N
G
T
I

M
E
S

E
C

O

N
D
S

Test Pair

Fig.

7.6.

Test Pair 2

1

Interaction of Test Pair x Trial Type for Group

In Group B,

B.

after being habituated to 12 180° trials, the infants

looked longer to the perceptually novel 112° test event.

This finding

provides support for the familiarity hypothesis but not necessarily in
the manner expected.

The familiarity hypothesis held that a high amount

of accumulated looking time would lead the infants to look longer to the

pg jfceptua 1 ly novel test event.

However, the habituation data indicated

in
that these infants accumulated no more looking time than the infants

the experimental groups who had only

7

habituation trials.

Again,

this

longer at the
finding is likely a result of the infants not looking

initial habituation trials than later trials.

In addition,

this was the

habituate 'see Table 7.3,
only condition in which infants failed to
75)

p.

accumulated looking
Perhaps it is not necessarily the amount of
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time which is important for encoding an event, but the number
of trials
that infants experience that may play a role in determining
what infants

will look at during the test trials.

This is only a speculation and

requires further testing for confirmation.
The Test Pair x Trial Type interaction indicated that infants'

increased looking at the 180° event and decreased looking at the 112°
event during the second test phase contributed to the overall difference

between the 180° and 112° events.
this pattern of results.

There is no obvious explanation for

One might expect that the infants should

dishabituate to the 112° event during the first test phase and show
converging looking time with the 180° event during the subsequent test
phases.

It might be the case that seeing two different events re-

elicited information processing in the infants and that they began to
actively compare the test events again.

Clearly such a hypothesis would

need further investigation.
In Group C,

the 4-month-old infants who received

7

112°
(M =

habituation events continued to look longer to the 112° test event
14.73
p <

s)

.03,

compared with the 180° test event
MSE = 147.55)

(see Fig.

7.3,

p.

(M =

75).

8.0 s,

F(l,

18)

=

6.29,

No other main effects nor

interactions were found.

Performance in this experimental group provides the strongest
support for the familiarity hypothesis.

Instead of looking at the

perceptually
"impossible" event, the infants looked longer at the

familiar "possible" event.

This finding suggests that what, how much,

habituation plays a
and possibly how often an event was seen during
during the test trials.
large role in what the infants will look at

Baillargeon (1987) who claimed
This conclusion is significant vis-a-vis
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that habituation merely familiarizes infants to the "strange
apparatus"

and focuses their interest on the apparatus so that they will
show

discriminatory behavior during the test trials.
logic,

According to this

the infants could be habituated to any movement of the paddle and

should still look longer at the 180° test event.

Clearly,

the

performance of the infants in this experimental group warn experimenters
against passive acceptance of this assumption.
For the 6-month-old infants in Group

event first) x

2

Test Pair

(

1

or

2

)

x

2

D,

Event

the

Order (180° or 112°

2

(180° or 112°)

mixed ANOVA

with order as a between-subj ect variable revealed no significant main
effects and no interactions for the 6-month-old infants who received

habituation trials.

7

This finding was surprising because these infants

accumulated the same amount of habituation time as the infants in the
other groups, a greater number reached Baillargeon

s

'

habituation

criterion (14), and they had the greatest percentage decrease in looking
time from the first three trials to the last three trials compared to
the infants in the other three experimental groups (see Table 7.3, p.
67

)

.

The infants in all four groups failed to show any significant sex

differences in looking at the 180° or 112° test events.
8

males and the 12 females looked an average of 16.3

respectively at the 180° test events (F(l,
99.59)
9.3

s

.

and the females looked an average of 9.9
the

7

=

14.84).

s

(F

s,

males looked an average of 8.07

looked an average of 4.5
MSE

= 1.001,

and 11.7
ns,

the

s

MSE =

of
During the 112° test events, the males looked and average

In Group B,

ns,

18)

s

In Group A,

s

at the 180° test events,

(1,18)

-

.04,

and the females
(F

(1,18)

=

4.07,

looked an
During the 112° test events, the males
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ns)

average 18.13

and the females looked an average of 9.05

s

2.005, na, M£E = 196.77).

Group

C,

the 10 males looked an average of 8.34
s,

(F

(1,18)

=

.04,

male infants looked at the 112° events 12.53
s,

(F

18)

(1,

=

(£(1,

.71,

looked an average of 7.62

ns.)

MSE

qs,

s,

and the females looked

s

=

18)

(1,

.65,

s

and the 10 females
MSE

ns,

=

females looked an average of 8.14

MSE

(F

s,

(1,

=

18)

.41,

ns,

The final dependent variables examined were infants'

and novelty preferences on the test trials.

unusual in habituation studies (Olson

a

index of visual preference is simple to obtain,
+

and the
=

66.67).

familiarity

Such an index is not

& Sherman,

compare the obtained value against 50% using

During

49.46).
s

(Total to New

The

Finally, the 10 male infants in Group D

.

(F

50.39).

=

the 112° test events, the males looked an average of 11.23

/

=

and the 10 females

s

looked at the 180° test events an average of 9.05

Total to New

18)

During the 180° test events for infants in

looked an average of 7.66

16.94

s,

1983)

and allows one to

one-sample t-test.
(Percent to Novel

Total to Old) x 100)

.

An
=

Significant

departure below 50% indicates a familiarity effect, whereas an obtained
value significantly above 50% indicates a novel preference.
Visual preferences were examined within each of the two test

phases as well as the average of the two test phases for all four

experimental groups.
Test Pair (Test Pair

Additionally, a
1,

Test Pair

2)

out effects due to counterbalancing.

2

Order (180° first or second) x

mixed ANOVA was performed to rule
Because of the few number of

who
habituation trials, it was expected that 4-month-old infants

received only

7

180° habituation trials

(Groups A & C) would show

180° test event).
significant familiarity preferences (i.e., prefer the

(Group-B) should show
Infants who received 12 180° habituation trials
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_

.

significant novelty preferences to the 112° test event because

perceptually novel.
180

(Group-D)

Finally,

is

it

6-month-olds who were habituated with

7

events should show novelty preferences to the 112° test

event because of faster and more thorough encoding of the habituation
event
The results indicated that during Test Phase

2

infants showed a significant familiarity preference
21.77,

t(19)

42.95,

SD = 16.24,

=

-2.48, p < .05)
t.19)

=

of Group A,
(M =

37.95, £D

SD = 23.68,

t.(19)

=

and an average familiarity preference (M=

-1.94, p <

.05)

.

The infants in Group B

demonstrated significant novelty preferences during Test Phase
61.9,

the

= 2.25,

p

<

.05).

2

(M =

These infants indicated an

overall novelty preference when the preferences across the two test

phases were averaged

Group

C,

(M =

p(19)

SD

=

17.29, p(19)

1

(M = 36.45,

SD

=

1.72, p <

22.56, p(19)

and approached significance in Test Phase
=

=

-1.44, p = .08).

2

16.14,

t(19)

=

-2.91, p

=

(M = 42.1,

In

.

-2.69, p <

SD = 24.55,

The infants exhibited a significant

familiarity preference when the test phases were averaged
=

.05)

the analyses indicated a familiarity preference that was

significant in Test Phase
.05)

56.65,

<

.05).

Finally,

(M = 39.5,

SD

the infants in Group D did

not exhibit familiarity or novelty preferences during the test trials.

All preferences and analyses are summarized in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Familiarity and novelty preferences during test trials for
Groups A-D

Novelty Percentage

Group

Test Phase

1

Test Phase

2

Average

A
180°

7
4

-month-olds

M
SD
t (19)

47.45
17.82
-.64

37.95
21.77
**
-2.48

51.0
19.98

61.9
23.68

.22

2.25

36.45
22.56
-2.69

42.1
24.55
-1.44

39.5
16.14
-2 .91***

55.1
27.03

51.0
23.35

53.3
17.26

.84

.19

.86

42.95
16.24
-1.94

*

B
12

180°

4-month-olds

M
SD
t (19)

56.65
17.29
*

1.72

*

C
7

112°

4-month-olds

M
SD
t (19)

Jr Jr

D
7

180°

6-month-olds

M
SD
t (19)

*

p < .05
E < -01
***
p <. 005

**
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CHAPTER VIII

OVERALL DISCUSSION

iL

The Imp ortance of Familiarity Effects?

The results of the experiments reported here provide mixed

evidence for the familiarity hypothesis.

The purpose of running infants

in Group-A was to replicate Baillargeon et al.
(1987)

(1985)

and Baillargeon

to make sure that the basic phenomenon of longer looking to the

180° test event could be re-elicited after a comparable number of

habituation trials were given to four-month-old infants.

After seven

habituation trials, the infants in Group-A did look longer to the 180°
test event.

However,

it

remained unclear whether this looking was due

to detecting a violation of physics or due to a preference for a

familiar event.
The procedure used in Group C was designed to begin to disentangle

these competing explanations.

The four-month-old infants in this group

were familiarized to seven 112° movements of the paddle and given the
same 180° and 112° test events as the other groups.

These infants

looked significantly longer to the familiar 112° test event.
finding may be at odds with Baillargeon

will look longer to
event)

a

'

s

Such a

interpretation that infants

cognitively novel event (i.e., the 180° test

after habituation.

These results provide some evidence that

familiar
infants may be preferring to look at whatever event is

regardless of the event's physical plausibility.
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.

The procedure used in Group B was designed to further
test the

familiarity hypothesis by increasing the number of habituation
trials.
It was hoped that twelve habituation trials would
allow the infants to

thoroughly encode the 180° movement of the paddle and that on test
trials they would prefer the perceptually novel 112° event.

They did in

fact prefer the 112° event, but this result must be interpreted

cautiously because this group failed to show
habituation.

a

decline in looking during

The lack of declining looking is attributable to a sample

of infants who did not look very long during the initial trials.

In

habituation studies it is not unusual to have a few infants who do not
look very long during the initial trials (Bornstein, 1985)

,

however it

is unusual to have a majority of the sample show such minimal looking.

As a result of this habituation pattern (which presumably is a result of

sampling error)

,

the results of Group B need to be interpreted

cautiously

With the proceeding caveat in mind, these data provide some
indication that after 12 habituation trials infants looked longer to the
112° event.

Such results provide tenuous support for the familiarity

hypothesis. After enough encoding time, the infants looked longer to

perceptually novel rather than

a

cognitively novel event.

interpretation needs to be further attenuated.

a

However, this

The infants in this

Group-Accumulated no more looking time during habituation than infants
accumulated
in the other three groups suggesting that the amount of
during
looking time is not the only determinante for event preferences
test trials.

habituation trials
It might be possible that the number of

trial preferences.
is an important factor in determining test

With each

their attention
habituation trial the infant has to organize and sustain
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to the apparatus.

The more often infants have to organize and sustain

their attention the greater the likelihood of thoroughly encoding
of the

habituation event.

Of course such an ad hoc interpretation needs to be

further tested to be confirmed.
a

In Study D,

the 6-month-olds exhibited

very nice habituation curve and accumulated as much looking time

during habituation as the other groups, yet failed to show any
significant preferences.

This finding is particularly troublesome for

the familiarity hypothesis because it was expected with the increased

processing speed of 6-month-olds, they would have shown a significant
novelty preference.

One might argue that these infants were at an

intermediate level of processing where perhaps they were moving from
familiarity preference to

a

novelty preference.

a

However, this

interpretation is unlikely given the steep slope of the habituation
curve. It is not clear how these data can be reconciled with the

familiarity hypothesis.

Baillargeon may have a plausible interpretation for the 6-montholds' data.

Baillargeon, Kotovsky, & Needham (1995) reported data that

indicated 6-month-old infants failed to show any significant preferences
during test trials after being habituated in the same manner as

Baillargeon (1987)

.

Baillargeon concluded that the infants were

"...responding simultaneously to both the physical novelty of the
impossible event and the perceptual novelty of the possible event"
92)

.

(p.

Baillargeon tested a second group of 6.5-month-old infants with

and found that
only one habituation trial to the 180° possible event
event.
they looked longer to a subsequent 180° impossible

According to

time to realize
Baillargeon, these infants did not accumulate enough
novel.
that the 112° possible event was perceptually
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These results

support both the

f amiliarity

hypothesis and a cognitive-perceptual

processing flip-flop hypothesis.
months

,

It should be remembered that by 6-

infants are able to sit up and may move around.

Furthermore,

their visual system is more acute than at four months, and there is more

information to obtain from the environment.
the

6

.

It might be

possible that

5-months-old infants quickly processed the moving paddle event and

then became more interested in other things.

Perhaps one trial might be

sufficient to show a familiarity preference, and maybe

would be sufficient to show a novelty preference.
trials,

2

or

3

trials

With more habituation

6.5-month-old infants may become bored with the entire procedure

and not show any sort of discriminatory behavior during the test trials.

Anecdotal evidence from Group D suggests that by the time these infants
got to the test trials, they were more interested in playing with their
feet or the car seat than paying attention to the apparatus.

More

research needs to be conducted to explore, in detail, the time-course of

processing by 6-month-olds in the moving paddle paradigm. Such research

would reveal at what point infants begin to show novelty preferences and
m ay provide possible clues as to why infants switch their interest from
cognitively novel to perceptually novel events.
These results provide some support (especially Group

B)

that using

for
the habituat ion-dishabituation paradigm might be problematic
of object
revealing whether or not infants have preconceived notions

permanence.

infants
These results do not preclude the possibility that

events, but they
have the ability to detect physically impossible

paradigm to control for
caution researchers using the habituation

possible familiarity effects.
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Research currently underway in our lab is beginning to investigate

controlling for familiarity effects by modifying the habituation trials
of the moving paddle paradigm.

Specifically, we are habituating infants

to a paddle movement of 150° and testing with the same 120° and 180°

test events as Baillargeon et al.

(1985).

If

infants really do detect

physically impossible events then they should look longer to the 180°
test event.

In this experiment,

longer looking to the 180° event cannot

be explained by a familiarity preference because the change from the

habituation event is 30° for both the physically possible and impossible
test events.

Furthermore, the results of the current studies provide some

converging evidence that infants are operating at
the violat ion-of-expectation paradigm.
(in press)

a

perceptual level in

Bogartz, Shinsky, and Speaker

were also interested in familiarity and novelty effects in

violation-of-expectation study by Baillargeon and Graber (1987).

a

In

this experiment, the ability of 5.5-month-old infants to represent and
to reason about the height and trajectory of occluded objects was

tested.

The infants were habituated to toy rabbits that slid back and

forth along a horizontal track whose center section was hidden by a
screen.

On alternate trials, the infants saw a short or tall rabbit

reappearing
slide along the track disappearing behind the screen, then
in the other side.

After habituation, the upper half of the mid-section

of the screen was removed creating a window.

The infants saw possible

I

and impossible test events.

In the possible event,

back and forth along the track behind the screen.
be seen through the window.

a short rabbit moved

This rabbit could noc

In the impossible event,

a tall rabbit

rabbit's ears were tall
moved back and forth along the track. This
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enough so that they should have been seen through the window, but in
fact they did not appear in the window when moving behind the screen.

The infants looked equally at the short and tall rabbit

habituation events but looked significantly longer at the impossible
than at the possible test event.

Baillargeon and Graber suggested that

the infants were able to represent the height of each rabbit behind the
screen.

Furthermore, the infants assumed that each rabbit continued to

pursue a line of movement behind the screen that was started on the side
of the screen and therefore, expected the tall rabbit to appear in the

screen window.

When the rabbit failed to appear in the window the

infants were surprised and showed greater looking time at this event.

Bogartz et al.,

(in press)

developed a theoretical position that

what was driving the infants to look during the test trials in

Baillargeon and Graber (1987) was not the realization that an impossible
event occurred, but rather a weighted combination of various aspects of

visual processing that underlie looking behavior.
such capabilities as:

fixating, tracking,

Bogartz et al., cite

scanning, encoding of

immediate and long-term representations, and comparison of immediate

representations with long-term representations. According to Bogartz et
al.,

these basic relatively well understood perceptual capabilities

sufficient
allow the infant to visually perceive the world and are

assuming high level
mechanisms to explain the test trial looking without
inferences about
cognitive abilities such as reasoning and drawing

occluded objects.
Bogartz et al
In the Event Set x Event Set design,

different habituation events:

(1)

a tall rabbit

.

,

used three

moving back and forth

habituation event);
behind a screen with no window (standard
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(2)

a tall

.

rabbit that moved behind a screen with the window removed which infants
to see the rabbit in the window ("possible event"); and

(

3

)

a tall

rabbit that moved behind the screen with the window removed, however the

infants were not able to see the rabbit in the window ("impossible
event").

All infants were then tested with:

behind the screen;

(

2

)

(1)

a tall rabbit moving

a tall rabbit that moved behind the screen with

the window removed allowing the infants to see the rabbit; and

(

3

)

a

tall rabbit that moved behind the screen with the window removed but the

infants were not able to see the rabbit in the window.
This research design allowed for the exploration of the influence
of a number of different variables that might affect looking times

during the test trials (e.g., change in event from habituation to test;

whether an event is possible; whether

a

change from habituation to test

involved a change from no window to window, or any other possible
construct the researcher might theorize has an affect on looking time)

Because one can develop many different hypotheses using this design,
^ 0 Sg 3 jpQber can pit different theories of infants'

a

looking against one

another using multiple regression analysis.
Bogartz et al., report several findings that have implications for
the familiarity hypothesis.

Bogartz et al., suggested that if infants

were possible
came to the lab with prior expectations about what events
them to take longer to
or impossible then one might reasonably expect

habituate to the impossible than the possible.

The results indicated

impossible conditions showed no
that infants habituated to possible and
events.
differences in accumulated looking times to the

Furthermore,

of the rabbit not showing
the results indicated that the impossibility

lead to an increase in looking
during the window test condition did not
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by the infants.

In fact,

the possible-impossible distinction appeared

to play no role in infants looking.

It should be

pointed out that the

results of Bogartz et al. did indicate that changes in events from

habituation to test (such as change from window to no window or rabbit
to no rabbit in the window)

elicited increased looking.

finding is not in accord with the familiarity hypothesis.

This particular

The

familiarity hypothesis would predict that the infants would look longer
at a perceptually familiar event, yet Bogartz et al. are finding that

when there is

a

visual change in the apparatus the infants show

increased looking.

Research currently underway in Bogartz' lab applying

the event set x event set design to the moving paddle paradigm might

give clues as to why there were no familiarity preferences.

Despite the discrepancy between the present study and the work of
Bogartz et al., the findings of our respective research programs provide

building support for perceptual explanations for infants' looking during

violation-of-expectation procedures.

It

is agreeed that infants'

looking times in these paradigms are in part the result of comparing

immediate representations with stored representations and not supportive
of higher level cognitive processes such as reasoning and drawing

inferences as theorized by Baillargeon and Spelke.

B.

Final

Comments

precocious
Future research and theoretical speculation about
above and beyond the
abilities need to take into account several issues

methodological concerns focused upon in this

dissertation.

underpinnings to support
Specifically, do infants have the neurological
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sophisticated cognitive functioning early in life?

Can research

paradigms other than the violation-of -expectation paradigm be created to
provide converging evidence for such precocious abilities?
On a broader level, an account of what is meant by infants having

knowledge of the physical world needs to be explicitly addressed, as
well as an account of how infants' knowledge fits into larger

epistemological schemes.

How is Spelke's nativistic theory of the

origins of knowledge rooted in the philosophical theories of Descartes
and Kant?

Descartes was concerned with establishing indubitable

principles (e.g., notion of self as

a

thinking being,

innate ideas of

identity, and God) upon which to build a theory of knowledge.

Kant was

interested in developing an account of the possibility of knowledge.
The innate categories merely provide structure for a morass of sense-

data impinging itself on the mind.

Knowledge itself was derived from

the resulting order of the categories but one should not confuse this

order with knowledge.

When Spelke and Baillargeon speak of early knowledge, do they mean
some understanding (which implies the infant posses beliefs and

intentions)

in a declarative sense?

This view would be difficult to

establish without a paradigm that requires infants to act on some
physical phenomenon to express beliefs and intentions.

Do they follow

automatically
the lead of Kant and mean by knowledge that the mind
without any
structures incoming information on an unconscious level

effort?

This view might be

more readily acceptable by a greater

necessarily constrains
number of theorists because the brain/mind

information in many ways.
the five senses

For example,

information is constrained by

than these senses);
(one cannot sense in ways different
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the visual system necessarily constrains visual perception to 3-

dimensions and to a small band of the light spectrum; and the mind
cannot understand that

2+3=6.

Similarly,

infants' minds/brains

might be able to constrain perceptual information in certain ways so
that they perceive a stable organized world.

Such perceptual

capabilities do not necessarily need to be conscious and they do not

need to be considred knowledge per se
foundation for knowledge.

.

but they can certainly provide a

Whatever view one has of the nature of

knowledge, attempts at clarifying what exactly is meant by infants

having "knowledge" would pay great dividends to psychologists interested
in the acquisition of knowledge and perhaps lead to a unified effort in

theorizing about early perception and cognition.
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